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INVESTMENT AND THE RIGHT TO 
FOOD: ADDRESSING DISPARATE 
PROTECTIONS AND PROMOTING 
RIGHTS-CONSISTENT OUTCOMES 
Kaitlin Y. Cordes and Anna Bulman* 
ABSTRACT 
Over the past decade, the world has witnessed heightened corporate 
interest in large-scale land-based agricultural investment.  While such 
investments can potentially have positive effects for local communities, they 
also can have wide-ranging negative impacts on human rights, including 
through forced displacement and the loss of livelihoods.  This Article 
examines the impact of large-scale corporate agricultural investment on the 
right to food, as well as on human rights more generally.  It considers the 
protections offered by the investment and human rights legal regimes to both 
corporations and individuals, including recent international developments 
relating to transnational corporate accountability and efforts to integrate 
human rights considerations into investment treaties and arbitration.  The 
current legal regimes, however, offer imbalanced protections, and 
emphasize remedial solutions for human rights abuses rather than pre-
emptive protection of rights.  While improving redress mechanisms is 
important, governments must also place greater emphasis on ensuring the 
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sustainability and rights-compatibility of investments from the outset.  This 
Article thus explores measures that could be taken by both host and home 
states to prevent right-to-food abuses in the context of large-scale 
agricultural investment. Greater efforts by host and home states to regulate 
and monitor investors could improve the design and implementation of such 
investments.  Better investments, in turn, could result in more rights-
consistent outcomes that promote, rather than harm, the right to food. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Food insecurity is not the result of global food scarcity.  There is 
enough food in the world to feed every person on this planet.1  Instead, 
poverty is one of the main causes of chronic hunger and food insecurity.2  
One frequently suggested solution to combat both poverty and hunger is to 
increase private sector investment in agriculture.3  Yet this approach, which 
relies on corporate agricultural investment serving as a catalyst for economic 
growth, often fails to directly address the layers of poverty that lead to 
hunger.  This generalized approach is particularly deficient when the legal 
environment in which such investment operates is not designed to foster the 
realization of human rights or developmental outcomes. 
Over the last decade, a variety of factors have led to a heightened 
private sector interest in agricultural investment, particularly large-scale 
land-based investment (LSLBI).4  While it may be too soon to quantify the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  What Causes Hunger?, WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME, 
http://www.wfp.org/HUNGER/CAUSES (last visited Apr. 5, 2016). 
2  See generally AMARTYA SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES: AN ESSAY ON ENTITLEMENT AND 
DEPRIVATION (1981); see also JEAN DRÈZE & AMARTYA SEN, HUNGER AND PUBLIC ACTION 
(1991). 
3  See, e.g., Laura German, George Schoneveld & Esther Mwangi, Contemporary 
Processes of Large-Scale Land Acquisition by Investors: Case Studies from Sub-Saharan 
Africa  (Ctr. for Int’l Forestry Res., Occasional Paper No. 68, 2011), 
http://www.cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/OccPapers/OP-68.pdf (explaining that 
governments and local (customary) entities are “often bolstered by an unwavering faith in the 
role of foreign private sector investment to drive national and local economic development 
and by new opportunities for extracting rents from the land alienation process.”). 
4  See, e.g., LORENZO COTULA, DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES OF THE 
UNION, ADDRESSING THE HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACTS OF ‘LAND GRABBING’ 8 (Dec. 2014), 
www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2014/534984/EXPO_STU%282014%29534
984_EN.pdf; see also KLAUS DEININGER ET AL., THE INT’L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & 
DEV. & WBG, RISING GLOBAL INTEREST IN FARMLAND: CAN IT YIELD SUSTAINABLE AND 
EQUITABLE BENEFITS? (2011), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/Rising-
Global-Interest-in-Farmland.pdf. 
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economic impacts of this increased investment,5 it is clear that in many cases 
such investments cause serious human rights violations rather than benefit 
the communities in which they operate.  The human rights abuses resulting 
from LSLBI are facilitated by legal and institutional factors that permit the 
entrenchment of local poverty and hunger through problematic investments. 
Two of the major stakeholder groups concerned with LSLBI are 
investors and the individuals in the communities where investment occurs.  
In this Article, we focus on these two groups, examine the primary legal 
regimes surrounding LSLBI, and explain why many of these investments are 
failing local communities.  In particular, we look at the impact of LSLBI on 
the human right to food. 
In Part I, we analyze the impacts that LSLBI can have on the right to 
food.  In Part II, we assess the protections afforded by the investment and 
human rights regimes to both corporate investors and communities.  Viewed 
together, these legal regimes, particularly at the international level, offer 
significantly imbalanced protections to corporations and individuals.  The 
regimes also fail to incentivize equitably designed investments that benefit 
both investors and the communities in which they operate.  Within Part II, 
we set out some of the recent international human rights and investment law 
developments that seek to address these weaknesses.  The developments 
include efforts to more effectively address the impacts of transnational 
corporations on human rights, as well as efforts to more fully incorporate 
human rights considerations into the international investment law regime.  
While some of these developments show promise in improving human rights 
protections through increasing the accountability of corporate actors, we 
note that the international investment and the human rights legal regimes are 
still far from affording comparable protections.  Finally, in Part III, we argue 
that greater efforts can be made by both host and home states to ensure the 
rights-compatibility of agricultural investments from the outset.  In this 
context, we discuss host and home state human rights obligations and 
explore measures that should be taken by governments to prevent right-to-
food and other human rights abuses in the context of LSLBI.  More inclusive 
business approaches, combined with an increased emphasis on host and 
home state measures to regulate and monitor investors, could improve the 
design and implementation of agricultural investment, resulting in more 
rights-consistent outcomes that promote, rather than harm, the right to food. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5  COTULA, supra note 4, at 15. 
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I.  THE IMPACT OF LARGE-SCALE LAND-BASED INVESTMENT ON THE 
RIGHT TO FOOD 
Agricultural investment has a variety of sources, including public 
investment, official development assistance, private investment (both on-
farm investment and foreign direct investment), and public-private 
partnerships.6  Private investment, in turn, is undertaken both by individuals 
and by corporate enterprises and may be driven by local or transnational 
actors.7  In this Article, we focus on transnational corporate investment.  In 
particular, we look at investment that is directed at the acquisition of large 
parcels of land for agricultural purposes—that is, large-scale land-based 
investment.  LSLBI can have positive effects for local communities, such as 
providing employment opportunities and technology transfer.  However, 
LSLBI can also create negative impacts on human rights, such as through 
forced displacement and the loss of livelihood.  The right to property, the 
right to adequate housing, the right to water, labor rights, political rights, and 
the right to a remedy may all be negatively affected by LSLBI.8  While the 
human rights impacts of LSLBI are wide-ranging, this Article focuses on the 
implications for the human right to food.  In this Part, we provide 
background on both LSLBI and the international human right to food.  We 
also explain the difficulties of measuring the impacts of LSLBI, before 
turning to consider both the positive and negative impacts of LSLBI, as well 
as how such investment may either contribute to or undermine the realization 
of the right to food. 
A. Large-Scale Land-Based Investment and the Right to Food: The Basics 
1. Large-Scale Land-Based Investment 
LSLBI commonly involves the transfer of large tracts of land from 
governments to investors.  There is no single accepted definition of what 
constitutes a “large-scale” agricultural investment.  The Land Matrix, a land 
monitoring initiative that maps land deals around the world, defines a “land 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6  Sarah K. Lowder, Brian Carisma & Jakob Skoet, Who Invests in Agriculture and How 
Much? 4-5 (FAO Agric. Dev. Econ. Division Working Paper No. 12-09, Dec. 2012), 
http://www.fao.org/3/a-ap854e.pdf. 
7  See, e.g., COTULA, supra note 4, at 11, 13 (“While much international attention has 
focused on transnational land deals, systematic national inventories of deals in selected 
countries point to an important role being played by local nationals. This primarily involves 
national elites – politicians, civil servants, entrepreneurs. But it can also involve parastatals.”) 
(citation omitted). 
8  Id. at 16-22. 
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deal” as a successful or failed attempt to acquire land that covers an area of 
200 hectares or more.9  The scale of such deals can vary dramatically, 
however, with many land investments covering more than 100,000 hectares 
each.10  Under these deals, land use rights are transferred through either the 
sale or lease of land.  Leases are often of long duration, with some in the 
range of 50 to 99 years.  In many places, the transfer of land commonly 
occurs between the national government and the investor in situations where 
local communities possess weak, informal, or customary land tenure rights.11 
Land investments have been undertaken by a diverse group of actors. 
These actors include private companies, institutional investors (e.g. pension 
funds, hedge funds, and private equity funds), state-owned enterprises, and 
sovereign wealth funds.12  Many investments have been undertaken by, or in 
partnership with, national investors, including through public-private 
partnerships.13  Although media attention has frequently focused on state-
affiliated entities investing in other countries, private companies have driven 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9  What Is a Land Deal?, LAND MATRIX, http://www.landmatrix.org/en/about/#what-is-a-
land-deal (last visited Jan. 20, 2016). 
10  For a list of deals, see LAND MATRIX, http://www.landmatrix.org/en/ (last visited Jan. 
20, 2016). 
11  When land users possess only weak, informal, or customary land rights, and the 
government retains formal ownership of the land (such as in much of Africa), the government 
may feel free to transfer the land parcel to the investor.  Even in situations in which land users 
have more defined and protected land rights, however, a government may use its power of 
eminent domain to make way for agricultural investment.  LORENZO COTULA, FAO, LAND 
TENURE ISSUES IN AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT: SOLAW BACKGROUND THEMATIC REPORT – 
TR05B 7-8, 
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/solaw/files/thematic_reports/TR_05B_web.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2016).  For an overview of the participants and process in land deals in Africa, 
see LORENZO COTULA, SONJA VERMEULEN, REBECA LEONARD & JAMES KEELEY, FAO, INT’L 
INST. FOR ENVTL AND DEV. (IIED) & IFAD, LAND GRAB OR DEVELOPMENT OPPORTUNITY? 
AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAND DEALS IN AFRICA 65-8 (2009), 
http://www.fao.org/3/a-ak241e.pdf. 
12  See Smita Narula, The Global Land Rush: Markets, Rights, and the Politics of Food, 49 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 101, 110-112 (2013); Olivier De Schutter, The Green Rush: The Global 
Race for Farmland and the Rights of Land Users, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 503, 516-17 (2011); 
WARD ANSEEUW ET AL., INT’L LAND COALITION, LAND RIGHTS AND THE RUSH FOR LAND: 
FINDINGS OF THE GLOBAL COMMERCIAL PRESSURES ON LAND RESEARCH PROJECT (2012), 
http://www.landcoalition.org/sites/default/files/documents/resources/ILC%20GSR%20report_
ENG.pdf. 
13  See Moral Hazard? ‘Mega’ Public–Private Partnerships in African Agriculture 
(Oxfam, Oxfam Briefing Paper No. 188, Sept. 1, 2014), 
http://www.oxfam.de/sites/www.oxfam.de/files/bp188-public-private-partnerships-
agriculture-africa-010914-en.pdf. 
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much of the recent investment.14  Still, it is difficult to measure how much 
total foreign direct investment (FDI) in land acquisitions is occurring.  Aside 
from the opacity of many deals, which renders accurate measurements 
difficult, FDI estimates do not count investments undertaken by institutional 
investors.15 
Investors choose to acquire land for a number of reasons.  A 2012 study 
by the International Land Coalition found that the increased interest in 
LSLBI arose from a combination of population growth, increased 
consumption, and more immediate factors such as “market demand for food, 
biofuels, raw materials and carbon sequestration.”16  Investments may be 
made to produce food for export, to produce biofuels or cash crops, to obtain 
carbon emissions credits for clean development mechanism projects, or even 
for speculative purposes.17  Within these objectives, an important distinction 
lies between land that is acquired but not used productively (i.e., mere 
acquisitions) and acquired land that is used productively.18  In this Article, 
we focus on LSLBI that involves productive investment. For production 
purposes, the underlying value of the land often derives from the water 
resources that make the land arable.19  In fact, it is often prime land––
irrigable and well situated––that is acquired through LSLBI.20 
The latest wave of LSLBI is occurring across the globe, although the 
largest recipients of investments appear to be countries in Africa and Asia.21  
The Land Matrix lists the top 10 target countries where investments are 
made as Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, South Sudan, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Congo, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, 
Liberia, and Sudan.22  Many of these target countries are home to weak or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14  For example, Western companies have been significant players in recent investment in 
biofuels in Africa. COTULA, supra note 4, at 13. 
15  Pascal Liu, Trade & Markets Division of FAO, Part One: Introduction, in TRENDS AND 
IMPACTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRY AGRICULTURE: EVIDENCE FROM 
CASE STUDIES 4 (Pedros Arias et al. eds., 2012), http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/est/ 
INTERNATIONAL-TRADE/FDIs/Trends_publication_12_November_2012.pdf. 
16  Id. at 3. 
17  Id.; Narula, supra note 12, at 107. 
18  ANSEEUW ET AL., supra note 122, at 21. 
19  See Howard Mann, Foreign Investment in Agriculture: Some Critical Contract Issues, 
17 UNIFORM L. REV. 129, 129-30 (2012). 
20  ANSEEUW ET AL., supra note 122, at 4. 
21  Id. For current Land Matrix statistics by target region, see By Target Region, LAND 
MATRIX, http://www.landmatrix.org/en/get-the-detail/by-target-region/ (last visited Jan. 20, 
2016). 
22  Web of Transnational Deals, LAND MATRIX, http://www.landmatrix.org/en/get-the-
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transitioning land tenure systems.23  The Land Matrix further reveals some 
interesting regional trends.  For example, of the 83 deals listed for the United 
States, the largest outward investor country, roughly 53 percent are in 
Africa, 29 percent are in South America, 12 percent are in Asia, and only 6 
percent are in the European continent.24  Meanwhile, the vast majority of 
land deals originating from Malaysia, which is the second largest investor 
country, occur in Indonesia and Cambodia.25  LSLBI occurs on both a global 
and an intra-regional basis.26  More broadly, the trend might be understood 
as one of entities from stronger industrialized countries acquiring land, 
whether through private or state-owned entities, in less developed countries.  
Although there are difficulties in quantifying the extent of global LSLBI, the 
data that is known and the documented effects of LSLBI reveal that this 
investment has local, regional, and global implications. 
Such implications are shaped in part by the form of the investment.  
Indeed, the impact on local communities may vary considerably depending 
on how the investment is designed and structured.  For example, a standard 
production-based scheme commonly entails large-scale monocropped 
plantations.  In such a scheme, the investor either owns the land or possesses 
sole land use rights and rarely produces diversified food crops for local 
consumption.  While local community members may benefit from such 
schemes, they also confront significant risks, particularly with respect to 
potential displacement.  Yet there exist other types of investment that do not 
involve the transfer of land use rights to the investor, instead permitting 
smallholder farmers to continue working their land.  These more “inclusive” 
agricultural investments include outgrower schemes and contract farming 
arrangements.27  At their most basic, these investments involve agreements 
between a company and smallholder farmers, under which the farmers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
idea/web-transnational-deals/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2016). 
23  See, e.g., De Schutter, supra note 12, at 504; DEININGER ET AL., supra note 4, at 55. 
24  United States of America, LAND MATRIX, http://www.landmatrix.org/en/get-the-
detail/by-investor-country/united-states-of-america/?order_by=target_country&more=70 (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2016). 
25  Malaysia, LAND MATRIX, http://www.landmatrix.org/en/get-the-detail/by-investor-
country/malaysia/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2016). 
26  See, e.g., ANSEEUW ET AL., supra note 12, at 4 (“Foreign direct investment (FDI) is also 
largely intra-regional.”). 
27  For a broader overview of the range of inclusive business models available, see SONJA 
VERMEULEN & LORENZO COTULA, FAO & INT’L INST. FOR ENVTL AND DEV. (IIED), MAKING 
THE MOST OF AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT: A SURVEY OF BUSINESS MODELS THAT PROVIDE 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR SMALLHOLDERS 3-4 (2010), 
http://www.ifad.org/pub/land/agri_investment.pdf. 
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supply agricultural products to the company, usually at a specified quantity 
and quality, and the company guarantees to purchase those products, often at 
a specific price.  Agreements may also include other benefits for farmers, 
such as increased access to inputs or credit.  Such inclusive business 
approaches support livelihoods through the guaranteed purchase of farmers’ 
crops, and, by not requiring the transfer of land use rights, can minimize 
concerns tied to the potential displacement of land users.28 
Some corporate agricultural investments incorporate more inclusive 
business approaches into standard LSLBI.  Under this model, an investor not 
only may receive land use rights over a large parcel of land, but may also 
develop a supplemental scheme that involves outgrower farmers.  For 
example, a number of oil palm contracts between the government of Liberia 
and investors both provide large concessions of leased land and incentivize 
the development of outgrower schemes.29  Understanding the various forms 
that LSLBI can take is particularly important when considering the positive 
and negative impacts that LSLBI, whether in its standard or “improved” 
form, can have. 
2. The Right to Food 
The right to be free from hunger is the only human right specifically 
identified as a “fundamental right” in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).30  Yet codification of the 
right to food, and the special urgency assigned to the right to be free from 
hunger, has not been fully realized.  Indeed, in the mid-1980s, Philip Alston, 
the current UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, 
wrote, “[T]he right to food has been endorsed more often and with greater 
unanimity and urgency than most other human rights, while at the same time 
being violated more comprehensively and systematically than probably any 
other right.”31  Measuring global progress 30 years later, the statement still 
carries great weight, with an estimated 795 million chronically 
undernourished people in the world today.32 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28  Id. 
29 For access to Liberian agricultural contracts, see Agriculture, SCRIBD., 
https://www.scribd.com/collections/4297678/Agriculture (last visited Jan. 20, 2016). 
30  G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
art. 11, ¶ 2 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
31  Philip Alston, International Law and the Human Right to Food in THE RIGHT TO FOOD 9 
(Philip Alston & Katarina Tomaševski eds., 1984). 
32  FAO, IFAD & WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME, THE STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY IN THE 
WORLD – MEETING THE 2015 INTERNATIONAL HUNGER TARGETS: TAKING STOCK OF UNEVEN 
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The right to food is espoused in a number of international covenants, 
declarations, and comments.33  Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) first articulated the right to food as the right of 
everyone to “a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of 
himself and of his family, including food.”  The right to food was 
subsequently enshrined in the ICESCR, a legally binding multilateral 
treaty.34  Article 11 of the ICESCR recognizes the right of everyone to an 
adequate standard of living, including adequate food.  It requires State 
Parties to take “appropriate steps” to realize this right.  Article 11 further 
recognizes the “fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger,” 
requiring State Parties to take measures to “improve methods of production, 
conservation and distribution of food” and “to ensure an equitable 
distribution of world food supplies in relation to need.”35 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights explains in its 
General Comment No. 12 that the right to food is realized “when every man, 
woman and child, alone or in community with others, has physical and 
economic access at all times to adequate food or means for its 
procurement.”36  The Committee describes the core content of the right as 
the sufficient availability of culturally acceptable food, with sustainable and 
rights-consistent access.37  As the Committee suggests, this accessibility 
includes both physical and economic access.38 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
PROGRESS 8 (2015), http://www.fao.org/3/a-i4646e.pdf. This figure may, however, be even 
higher, depending on how the hungry are counted. See Frances Moore Lappé et al., How We 
Count Hunger Matters, 27 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 251 (2013). 
33  For a discussion of the normative evolution of the right to food, see Smita Narula, 
Reclaiming the Right to Food as a Normative Response to the Global Food Crisis, 13 YALE 
HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 403 (2010). 
34  ICESCR, supra note 30, at art. 11, ¶ 2(a). 
35  Id. art. 11, ¶ 2(b). 
36  U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Committee on Econ. Soc. & Cultural Rights (CESCR), 
General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11), ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999) [hereinafter General Comment No. 12]. 
37  Id. ¶¶ 7-8. 
38  Id. ¶ 13. See also Olivier De Schutter (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Final 
Report: The Transformative Potential of the Right to Food, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/57 at 3 
(Jan. 24, 2014), 
http://www.srfood.org/images/stories/pdf/officialreports/20140310_finalreport_en.pdf.  For 
other discussions on the right to food, see Narula, supra note 33; Smita Narula, The Right to 
Food: Holding Global Actors Accountable Under International Law, 44 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 691 (2006); Laura Niada, Hunger and International Law: The Far-Reaching 
Scope of the Human Right to Food, 22 CONN. J. INT’L L. 131 (2006); Lily Endean Nierenberg, 
Note, Reconciling the Right to Food and Trade Liberalization: Developing Country 
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Aside from the ICESCR, the right to food has been codified in other 
legally binding instruments.  At the international level, for example, the right 
to food is protected in the Convention on the Rights of the Child and in the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.  The closely related 
right to adequate nutrition is protected in the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.39  The right to food is also 
recognized in regional agreements.40  In addition, aspects of the right to food 
are protected through other codified human rights.  For example, article 6(1) 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognizes the 
right to life.41  This has been interpreted by the Human Rights Council as 
involving a state obligation to adopt affirmative measures to eliminate 
malnutrition.42 
Human rights obligations impose tripartite duties on states to respect, 
protect, and fulfill human rights.  In the case of the right to food, the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights explains that under the 
obligation to respect the right to food, states should not take any measures 
that prevent access to adequate food.43  Under the obligation to protect the 
right to food, states must ensure that third parties do not deprive individuals 
of access to adequate food.  This obligation means that states must protect 
persons from right-to-food abuses that might arise from corporate LSLBI.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Opportunities, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. 619 (2011). 
39  Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 24, ¶ 2(c), (e), Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 
3 (entered into force Feb. 9, 1990); Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, art. 
27, ¶ 3, 25(f), 28, ¶ 1, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force May 3, 2008); 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, art. 12, ¶ 2, 
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981). See also The Right to 
Adequate Food: Fact Sheet No. 34, 7-8, U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. 
RTS. (Apr. 2010), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet34en.pdf. 
40  See, e.g., Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area 
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 12, Nov. 17, 1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. A-52; 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Art. 14, ¶ 2(c), (d), (h), July 11, 1990, 
OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (entered into force Nov. 29, 1990); Protocol to the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, art. 14 ¶ 2(b), 15, 
July 11, 2003, http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/women-
protocol/achpr_instr_proto_women_eng.pdf. See also The Right to Adequate Food, supra 
note 39, at 7-8. 
41  G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (Dec. 16, 
1966), http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
42  Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 6: Article 6 (Sixteenth session, 1982), 
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human 
Rights Treaty Bodies, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 6 (1994). 
43  General Comment No. 12, supra note 36, ¶ 15. See also Narula, supra note 38, at 707-
08. 
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Finally, under the obligation to fulfill the right to food, states must, inter alia, 
work to strengthen individuals’ access to food, which can include their 
utilization of resources and the means to ensure their livelihood.  
Importantly, as currently conceptualized in international human rights law, 
human rights obligations are owed by states to individuals.44  As such, 
although private companies have responsibilities to respect the right to food, 
governments are central to ensuring the realization of the individuals’ right 
to food.45 
As Olivier De Schutter, the former UN Special Rapporteur on the right 
to food, explains, individuals can secure access to food through three 
channels: “(a) by earning incomes from employment or self-employment; (b) 
through social transfers; or (c) by producing their own food, for those who 
have access to land and other productive resources.”46  These three channels 
provide a useful framework for analyzing the positive and negative impacts 
of LSLBI on the right to food. The remainder of Part I examines such 
impacts. 
B. Measuring the Impacts of Large-Scale Land-Based Investment 
Accurately measuring the impacts of LSLBI is difficult.  Aside from the 
question regarding which framework to use when assessing the investments, 
difficulties range from the limited amount of available information to the 
reliability of researchers’ conclusions on impact.  In addition, assessing the 
right-to-food implications of LSLBI adds another level of complexity, as 
investments can generate mixed right-to-food outcomes.  We now address 
the primary difficulties of measuring impacts and, in doing so, explain the 
perspective we adopt in assessing LSLBI. 
As Smita Narula has argued, there are two main frameworks that can be 
used when assessing the impacts of LSLBI: the market-plus approach and 
the rights-based approach.47  Broadly speaking, the market-plus approach 
“balances the harms arising from land deals against the benefits of 
generating greater agricultural investment.”48  The rights-based approach is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44  For a summary of corporate human rights responsibilities, see EQUITABLE CAMBODIA & 
INCLUSIVE DEV. INT’L, BITTERSWEET HARVEST: A HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION’S EVERYTHING BUT ARMS INITIATIVE IN CAMBODIA 45 (2013), 
http://www.inclusivedevelopment.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Bittersweet_Harvest_web-
version.pdf. 
45  See Narula, supra note 33, at 406-07. 
46  De Schutter, supra note 38, ¶ 2. 
47  For a comprehensive discussion of each approach, see Narula, supra note 12. 
48  Id. at 107. 
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based upon international human rights obligations and focuses on states’ 
legal obligations to prevent negative human rights impacts that might 
otherwise be balanced away as “risks” under the market-plus approach.49  In 
this Article, to fully address the right-to-food implications of LSLBI, we 
adopt the rights-based framework in assessing corporate LSLBI impacts, the 
relevant governmental obligations, and the surrounding legal frameworks. 
Features specific to the recent wave of LSLBI render it difficult to 
evaluate the full impacts of this type of investment.  As Lorenzo Cotula 
observes, “assessing the socio-economic outcomes of large land deals is 
riddled with difficulties.”50  To start, both data availability and data access 
pose particular challenges for measuring the socio-economic impacts of 
LSLBI.  Government capacity to record land deals and to effectively manage 
related data varies, with low levels of capacity affecting data availability.51  
Even if data is kept, it may not be publicly available, thus posing issues of 
accessibility.52  Moreover, it is simply too early in the life of many of these 
investments to draw definitive conclusions about socio-economic 
outcomes.53  Investments take time to become fully operational, and the full 
impacts of investments may take a while to unfold.54  This creates particular 
difficulties in assessing impacts for those taking a market-plus approach.  
For example, Cotula emphasizes that looking at short-term effects may skew 
impressions, given that “negative impacts – loss of land, for instance – are 
often felt first, while jobs, opportunities for local businesses and government 
revenues may only fully materialise at a later stage.”55  Although a rights-
based perspective does not engage in such a balancing calculation, it too is 
stymied by the lack of clarity resulting from the evolving nature of such 
investments and their impacts.  This flux, combined with obstacles to data 
accessibility and availability, presents undeniable difficulties for drawing 
robust conclusions regarding investment impacts. 
Other limitations relate to the methodology used by researchers studying 
LSLBI.  In a 2013 scoping review of the epistemological and 
methodological literature on the impacts of land grabs in Africa, Carlos Oya 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49  Id. at 135-36. 
50  Lorenzo Cotula et al., Testing Claims About Large Land Deals in Africa: Findings from 
a Multi-Country Study, 50 J. DEV. STUD. 903, 919 (July 2014); see also COTULA, supra note 4, 
at 15. 
51  Cotula et al., supra note 500, at 904-05. 
52  Id. 
53  COTULA, supra note 4, at 15. 
54  Id. 
55  Cotula et al., supra note 50, at 919. 
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revealed that “there are still major thematic and analytical gaps and 
methodological problems with what is being published, particularly with 
regard to evidence on socio-economic impacts, a central issue in debates on 
‘land grabs.’”56  A primary problem, according to Oya, was the universal 
lack of a rigorous baseline that allowed before-and-after comparisons.57  He 
argues that this problem has led to “very limited and often biased evidence 
on impacts.”58  Further, the available literature often fails to disaggregate 
information on the standard form of LSLBI—that is, land acquisition and a 
plantation—from information on more inclusive business models.  This 
complicates efforts to measure investment impacts.  Whether using the 
market-plus approach or the rights-based approach, these methodological 
limitations can affect conclusions regarding the impacts of LSLBI. 
Measuring the true positive and negative right-to-food impacts of 
LSLBI presents its own set of challenges.  There are two specific tensions 
that arise.  First, LSLBI, depending on the type of investment and the 
markets for which the products are destined, may increase food availability 
in one place and decrease it in another.  To the extent that this correlates 
with increased or decreased access, an investment could have implications 
for food security and the realization of the right to food.  That is, an 
investment could have positive implications where food availability and 
access is increased and negative impacts where it is decreased.  Second, 
LSLBI may have positive impacts for some individuals but negative impacts 
for others in the same community.  For example, some individuals may 
benefit from the investment by being hired as employees, while smallholder 
farmers may be harmed by the same investment if they are displaced from 
their land.  These disparate impacts have their own set of mixed implications 
for food security and the realization of the right to food.  Measured on the 
regional level or community level, the net effect of the investment, as 
measured in individuals whose food security has been affected, may end up 
being neutral, or even slightly positive in favor of increased food security, 
even though some individuals’ right to food may have been seriously 
impeded by the investment.  A rights-based assessment, however, is not 
satisfied with a net positive impact, even when measuring the number of 
individuals whose right to food was positively affected as compared with 
those whose right to food was negatively affected.  The right to food is a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56  Carlos Oya, The Land Rush and Classic Agrarian Questions of Capital and Labour: A 
Systematic Scoping Review of the Socioeconomic Impact of Land Grabs in Africa, 34 THIRD 
WORLD Q. 1532, 1533 (Oct. 2013). 
57  Id. at 1541. 
58  Id. at 1553. 
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right guaranteed to all human beings.  Thus, a rights-based approach to 
assessing LSLBI impacts focuses on the right-to-food impacts at the 
individual level.  Investments that have increased food security for some 
individuals but interfered with the ability of others to access food may point 
to governmental failures to protect or respect the right to food. 
C. Positive Impacts of Large-Scale Land-Based Investment on the Right to 
Food 
If managed appropriately, LSLBI can have positive impacts on the right 
to food.  Beneficial effects may be more likely when investments are 
structured in certain ways––for example, by including an outgrower scheme.  
This potential for benefit is emphasized by the findings of one recent study 
undertaken by the World Bank and United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), which examined 39 large-scale, mature 
agribusiness investments in sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia and their 
approaches to social, economic, and environmental responsibility.59  The 
study covered investments that involved land acquisition as well as those 
with no land acquisition60 and concluded that, in general, “private sector 
investments, including those that involve land acquisition, can generate 
positive outcomes if conducted in a socially and environmentally responsible 
manner.”61 
The study did not distinguish between types of investments involving 
land acquisition, complicating efforts to draw conclusions about the impacts 
of LSLBI with outgrower schemes versus those without.  Nevertheless, the 
study found that the top five positive impacts mentioned by stakeholders62 
regarding investments that involved land acquisition (both pure estates and 
estates with outgrower schemes) were employment, infrastructure, access to 
markets, food security, and education.63  In addition to these benefits, 
stakeholders mentioned technology transfer, working conditions, outgrower 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59  HAFIZ MIRZA, WILLIAM SPELLER & GRAHAME DIXIE, WORLD BANK & UNCTAD, THE 
PRACTICE OF RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT PRINCIPLES IN LARGER-SCALE AGRICULTURAL 
INVESTMENTS: IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE PERFORMANCE AND IMPACT ON LOCAL 
COMMUNITIES (Apr. 2014), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wb_unctad_2014_en.pdf. 
60  The study examined the following types of investments: 17 estates, 14 estates combined 
with outgrower schemes, 7 processing factories, and 7 trading companies. Id. at 3-4. 
61  Id. at xix. 
62  Over 550 stakeholders’ views were considered.  Those stakeholders included the 
following: resident near investment, employee, outgrower/contract farmer, government 
official, cooperative, community leader, previous land user, migrant, supplier/customer, 
NGO, and resettled person.  Id. at xiii, 5. 
63  Id. at xiv. 
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schemes, access to water, and access to finance.  The study also found that 
outgrower schemes had particular advantages over pure estates, due largely 
to the fact that such schemes allowed farmers to retain control over their land 
and generated higher numbers of jobs.64  However, the study found that in 
many cases outgrower schemes were only accessible to farmers who were 
relatively well-off, as the schemes often require a minimum acreage to 
participate as well as access to transportation.65  In short, while LSLBI has 
the potential to generate socio-economic benefits for communities and host 
countries, the specific nature and extent of the benefits depend, at least in 
part, on the investment approach used.  Further, even more inclusive 
approaches may not benefit all smallholder farmers. 
The positive impacts that LSLBI in its various forms can generate may, 
in turn, have positive impacts on the realization of the right to food.  
Recalling the three channels of food accessibility described by Olivier De 
Schutter,66 individuals can secure access to food, first, through employment, 
second, through social transfers, or third, by producing their own food.  The 
positive economic effects described by stakeholders in the above study––
employment generation, market access, and access to finance––may improve 
a person’s purchasing power and ability to meet his or her daily food needs.  
To the extent that an investor creates employment opportunities for local 
community members, either through direct employment or by creating 
demand for ancillary inputs or services, an investment can help individuals 
realize their right to food through the first channel.  Outgrower schemes 
attached to LSLBI may also create market access or provide access to 
finance, both of which can help smallholder farmers increase their household 
income and ability to secure access to food.  In addition, non-outgrower 
farmers might also benefit from investments by taking advantage of new 
road infrastructure that help them get their own products to markets, 
assuming that they retain access to arable land. 
In some cases, LSLBI generates improved water infrastructure that 
other parties can access.67  Smallholder farmers who gain greater access to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64  MIRZA, SPELLER & DIXIE, supra note 59, at 26-7. 
65  Id. at 27. 
66  See Part I.A.2. 
67  See, e.g., Hafiz Mirza & William Speller, The Practice of Responsible Investment 
Principles in Larger-Scale Agricultural Investments, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (May 
14, 2014), http://www.iisd.org/itn/2014/05/14/the-practice-of-responsible-investment-
principles-in-larger-scale-agricultural-investments/ (discussing local water provision schemes 
associated with financially-inclusive business models).  Access to water is, however, a 
contested point.  For example, access to water was listed as both a positive and a negative 
impact for all investments and investments involving land acquisitions in the World Bank 
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water through such infrastructure may improve their ability to produce their 
own food.  This, in turn, can increase food access through the third channel 
of self-production.  Of course, this potential right-to-food benefit assumes 
that people are not displaced from their productive resources in the first 
place.  Outgrowers may also receive third-channel support from investments 
in situations in which they are allowed to keep a percentage of food crops for 
their own use.  This is fairly rare in practice, especially because most 
outgrower schemes entail the production of just one crop—which often is for 
purposes other than food—such as jatropha or oil palm.  Finally, in cases 
where the investment is producing food for local markets, there is the 
potential for more general positive food security benefits for net-food 
purchasers, including both urban consumers and other smallholder farmers.  
Still, this is a complicated proposition that is difficult to measure.  In 
general, in situations in which LSLBI does generate the positive benefits 
discussed above, these benefits can support the realization of the right to 
food. 
The above discussion demonstrates that while LSLBI has the potential 
to bring significant positive developments to local communities and improve 
the realization of the right to food, these benefits are contingent upon a 
number of factors.  The type of business model, the extent of employment 
opportunities generated, and the accessibility of project-related 
developments, such as water or road infrastructure, shape an investment’s 
impact on the right to food.  Moreover, what an investment does not do is 
equally important, as LSLBI that interrupts individuals’ access to resources 
will detrimentally affect their right to food.  On this note, we turn to consider 
some of the negative impacts that have been attributed to LSLBI, including 
how these impacts can violate the right to food. 
D.  Negative Impacts of Large-Scale Land-Based Investment on the Right 
to Food 
While long-term developmental impacts of LSLBI may be hard to 
measure, shorter-term negative impacts are easier to assess and have been 
documented in a number of reports.  One of the most pressing issues 
associated with LSLBI is its impact on access to land and productive 
resources.  In many of the low- and middle-income countries in which 
LSLBI occurs, land is often held by local people on an informal basis.  In 
some countries, the government may lease land that it technically owns, 
regardless of whether existing land users can claim legitimate tenure rights 
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acquisition.  See MIRZA, SPELLER & DIXIE, supra note 59. 
104 20 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOR. AFF. 87 (2016) 
over the land.68  Land issues may also arise in the context of LSLBI when 
investors or governments do not fully understand the land’s productive use.  
Whereas an investor lacking knowledge of the local context may believe 
some land is unoccupied, this land may in fact be relied on, such as in a 
fallow season or for intermittent livestock grazing.  In addition to a lack of 
formal recognition of existing land rights, which places land users in a 
precarious position, other legal and institutional factors can also negatively 
affect the ability of land users to protect their rights.  For example, in many 
places, the conditions and process for land acquisition are unclear, 
resettlement processes––including consultation and compensation––are 
inadequate, and communities are neither involved in decision-making 
processes over land acquisitions nor afforded sufficient grievance 
mechanisms once they occur.69 
In the context of insecure land rights and an institutional framework that 
does not support land users, a significant negative impact that commonly 
results from LSLBI is the taking of smallholder farmers’ land, as well as 
common lands, with inadequate or no compensation.70  The results can be 
quite devastating for individuals and communities.  If land is acquired 
without proper compensation for former land users, the acquisition can lead 
to their loss of livelihood opportunities.  This, in turn, can cause increased 
food insecurity.71  In addition, as large land deals are often more prevalent in 
specific regions, they can lead to increased competition for land72 and even 
conflict over access to land. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68  There is a distinction between documented tenure rights and legitimate tenure rights. 
See, e.g., FAO, VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES ON THE RESPONSIBLE GOVERNANCE OF TENURE OF 
LAND, FISHERIES AND FORESTS IN THE CONTEXT OF NATIONAL FOOD SECURITY, § 3.1, ¶ 1 
(2012), http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i2801e/i2801e.pdf [hereinafter VOLUNTARY 
GUIDELINES] (urging states to “take reasonable measures to identify, record and respect 
legitimate tenure right holders and their rights, whether formally recorded or not.”). 
69  See Mirza & Speller, supra note 67. 
70  See, e.g., Daniel Fitzpatrick, The Legal Design of Land Grabs: Possession and the State 
in Post-Conflict Cambodia, in LAND GRABS IN ASIA WHAT ROLE FOR THE LAW? (Connie 
Carter & Andrew Harding eds., 2015). 
71  See Mirza & Speller, supra note 67; Private Investment in Agriculture: Why It’s 
Essential and What’s Needed, OXFAM, http://www.oxfam.org/en/research/private-investment-
agriculture-why-its-essential-and-whats-needed (last visited Jan. 20, 2016); TECH. COMM. ON 
LAND TENURE & DEV., LARGE-SCALE LAND ACQUISITION AND RESPONSIBLE AGRICULTURAL 
INVESTMENT: FOR AN APPROACH RESPECTING HUMAN RIGHTS, FOOD SECURITY AND 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 3-4 (June 2010), http://www.agter.asso.fr/IMG/pdf/french-
position-paper.pdf; Jared Wigginton, Large-Scale Land Investment in Africa: An Issue of Self-
Help and Self-Determination, 20 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 105, 112-14 (2013). 
72  See, e.g., COTULA, supra note 4, at 8, 10. 
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Even when LSLBI does not directly displace land users, investments 
can still negatively affect livelihoods through their impact on the 
environment.  The environmental impact assessments undertaken for LSLBI 
are often inadequate, especially with regard to water.73  This can lead to the 
implementation of projects that negatively affect nearby communities.  
These impacts can extend downstream, resulting in individuals’ loss of 
access to water either because it has been diverted or because it has been 
polluted by run-off from the chemical inputs used in farming.74  In addition, 
LSLBI may cause environmental destruction through deforestation, the 
overexploitation of water resources, and soil degradation from 
monocropping.75  Such environmental damage can affect individuals’ 
livelihood strategies. 
The livelihood impacts for local communities, including from reduced 
land access, can be significant.  One recent study attempted to estimate the 
effects of LSLBI76 on local communities’ incomes in the 28 countries most 
targeted by such investments.77  This study found that land investment can 
potentially negatively affect the incomes of approximately 12 million people 
globally.78  While this type of measurement may be inherently difficult to 
make for the reasons discussed above, it does show the potential magnitude 
of the livelihood impacts of displacement caused by LSLBI. 
While the benefits of LSLBI are commonly touted in economic gains 
for the local economy, LSLBI is often not the optimal approach to reduce 
poverty.  As De Schutter has observed, the acceptance of such investment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73  Mirza & Speller, supra note 67. 
74  See, e.g., MICHAEL RICHARDS, RIGHTS & RESOURCES INITIATIVE, SOCIAL AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF AGRICULTURAL LARGE-SCALE LAND ACQUISITIONS IN AFRICA—
WITH A FOCUS ON WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICA 24-27 (Mar. 2013), 
http://www.rightsandresources.org/documents/files/doc_5797.pdf. 
75  See id. at 7, 24-27. 
76  Termed “land grabbing” in this Article. 
77  See Kyle F. Davis, Paolo D’Odorico, & Maria Cristina Rulli, Land Grabbing: A 
Preliminary Quantification of Economic Impacts on Rural Livelihoods, 36 POPUL. ENVIRON. 
180 (2014), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4223572/. 
78  The authors of the study concluded that: 
Our conservative estimate of over 12 million people losing their incomes is more 
than one-third of the number of internally displaced people due to conflict (29 
million people) (IDMC 2013a) and one quarter of the number of migrations 
induced by natural hazards in 2012 (32 millions) (IDMC 2013b).  This relatively 
large number of people may contribute to issues of food insecurity and poverty 
in rural areas while challenging the sustainability of urban growth as affected 
people seek to diversify household income (UN DESA 2011). 
  Id. at 190. 
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“implies huge opportunity costs, as it will result in a type of farming that 
will have much less powerful poverty-reducing impacts, than if access to 
land and water were improved for the local farming communities.”79  A 
country working to reduce poverty through its agricultural sector may be 
more successful if it does not rely on LSLBI.  For example, a 2012 United 
Nations Development Program working paper examining recent large-scale 
land acquisitions in Mozambique concluded that “the country’s demographic 
and sociopolitical characteristics suggest that a labor intensive rural 
development strategy may be more suitable than the attraction of large-scale 
investments in farmland.”80 
As discussed in Part I.C above, more inclusive business approaches may 
result in greater community benefits.  For instance, by integrating outgrower 
schemes into LSLBI, investments can better support farmers’ livelihood 
opportunities and help improve their household food security.  Although 
these approaches have the potential to be more beneficial than LSLBI that 
have not incorporated a more inclusive approach, such investments, if 
structured poorly, can be deeply problematic and disempowering for the 
farmers involved.  In some contexts, such as if the farmers put up their land 
as collateral because their original bargaining ability was weak, these 
schemes can even lead to the farmers’ eventual loss of resources.81 
Each of these negative effects of LSLBI can impede the realization of 
the right to food.  An investment that displaces farmers or individuals from 
land without proper compensation, or that otherwise impedes their livelihood 
strategies, can render them more food insecure than before the investment 
occurred.  If there is no income from employment, no social transfers set up 
to aid the transition, and no ability to produce food for themselves, then none 
of the three channels for securing food will be available to those harmed by 
LSLBI.  Further, if the government has permitted an investment that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79  Olivier De Schutter, How Not to Think of Land-Grabbing: Three Critiques of Large-
Scale Investments in Farmland, 38 J. PEASANT STUD. 249, 249 (Mar. 2011). 
80  ELLEN AABØ & THOMAS KRING, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LARGE-SCALE 
AGRICULTURAL LAND ACQUISITIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR FOOD SECURITY AND 
LIVELIHOODS/EMPLOYMENT CREATION IN RURAL MOZAMBIQUE 6 (UNDP Working Paper No. 
2012-004, Jan. 2012), 
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/rba/docs/Working%20Papers/Agriculture%20Rural%20Mo
zambique.pdf. 
81  On the potential risks and benefits of alternative business models, including on the right 
to food, see Olivier De Schutter (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Report Presented 
at the 66th Session of the U.N. General Assembly, Towards More Equitable Value Chains: 
Alternative Business Models in Support of the Right to Food, U.N. Doc. A/66/262 (2011), 
http://www.srfood.org/images/stories/pdf/officialreports/srrtf_contractfarming_a-66-262.pdf. 
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interferes with existing access to food, and has failed to mitigate this impact 
in a way that supports continued access to food, such investment facilitation 
would constitute a violation of its obligation to protect the right to food. 
Thus, while greater investment in food crops for local markets could 
theoretically help improve local food security, investment directed at food 
crops for export or non-food agricultural crops could actually decrease local 
food supply, as productive land is tied up in export-oriented or non-food 
production. 
The negative right-to-food impacts that LSLBI can have are illustrated 
in a Cambodian case that has garnered substantial international attention.  
Cambodia has been host to some particularly negative land grabs,82 fueled 
by an inadequate land ownership system, conflict-caused displacement, and 
elite control over land rights allocation.83 
In 2006, the Cambodian Government granted economic land 
concessions to the Cambodian sugar companies Koh Kong Plantation and 
Koh Kong Sugar Industry (together “Koh Kong companies”) over land to 
which local villagers also held claims.84  Both companies are jointly owned 
by the Thai company Khon Kaen Sugar Industry, Taiwanese Ve Wong 
Corporation, and Cambodian Senator Ly Yong Phat.  The concessions were 
granted for 90 years over 9,400 ha and 9,700 ha, respectively.85  These 
concessions, which were to be used for sugar plantations, were the site of a 
violent eviction and involuntary relocation of some 4,000 Koh Kong 
villagers from their lands.  In 2007, the Community Legal Education Center 
of Cambodia, on behalf of community members, filed civil and criminal 
claims in the Koh Kong Provincial Court, alleging that the community 
members had not been consulted prior to the grant of the concessions and 
that the transfer of the land was illegal.86  They sought cancellation of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82  See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, supra note 70. 
83  Id. 
84  Koh Kong Sugar Plantation Lawsuits (re Cambodia), BUS. & HUM. RTS. RESOURCE 
CTR., http://business-humanrights.org/en/koh-kong-sugar-plantation-lawsuits-re-
cambodia#c86294 (last visited Jan. 20, 2016); see also The Sre Ambel Communities and the 
Koh Kong Sugar Plantation, EARTHRIGHTS INT’L, http://www.earthrights.org/legal/sre-ambel-
communities-and-koh-kong-sugar-plantation (last visited Jan. 20, 2016). 
85  BITTERSWEET HARVEST, supra note 44, at 25. 
86  The criminal case was dismissed. See Bureau of Econ. & Bus. Aff., Community Legal 
Education Center of Cambodia (CLEC)/EarthRights International (ERI) and American Sugar 
Refining Inc. (ASR), U.S. DEP’T OF ST. (June 20, 2013), 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/oecd/usncp/links/rls/210970.htm. For a discussion of the procedural 
history of the case, see Mahdev Mohan, The Road to Song Mao: Transnational Litigation 
from Southeast Asia to the United Kingdom, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND e-30, e-33 (2014), 
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concession contract.  In 2009, the Koh Kong companies entered into a five-
year contract for the sale of sugar from Cambodian plantations with the 
United Kingdom company Tate & Lyle.87  In 2013, after local judicial and 
administrative inaction, 200 of the villagers filed a complaint in the UK 
Commercial Court against Tate & Lyle and T&L Sugars Limited, claiming 
legal ownership of the plantation land from which the company was 
sourcing sugar.  This legal ownership of the land, they argued, constituted 
legal ownership of the crops grown on the land.88  Nine years after the 
concessions were granted, the litigation is still ongoing. 
The villagers’ evictions from the land to make way for the concessions 
decreased their food security and impeded the realization of their right to 
food.  This was documented in a 2013 human rights impact assessment, 
which sought to examine the human rights implications of the European 
Commission’s “Everything But Arms” initiative in the sugar sector in 
Cambodia.89  One of the three provinces surveyed in the human rights 
impact assessment was Koh Kong.  The assessment examined the state of 
community members’ human rights prior to evictions, during evictions, and 
after evictions. Post-eviction findings on the right to food included the 
following: 
In each research area, the majority of households reported increased 
food insecurity after the sugar concessions, as a result of reduced 
access to land and natural resources that affected communities 
previously depended upon to realize their right to food.90 
The outcomes were particularly grim for some of the evicted villagers.  
The assessment goes on to find that “[t]he forced evictions have in some 
cases led to extreme hunger and possibly even starvation.”91  The assessment 
documents the villagers’ reliance on the land to access food in two ways 
prior to the evictions and LSLBI: either through the third channel of 
producing their own food or through the first channel of earning incomes 
from self-employment.  Their loss of access to productive land rendered 
them unable to produce rice for food stocks and for sale in exchange for 
other goods.  The Cambodian government has failed to meet its obligations 
to respect and protect the right to food by facilitating the evictions and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.asil.org/sites/default/files/AGORA/201401/Mohan%20AJIL%20Unbound%20e-
30%20%282014%29.pdf. 
87  Koh Kong Sugar Plantation Lawsuits, supra note 84. 
88  Id. 
89  BITTERSWEET HARVEST, supra note 444. 
90  Id. at 70. 
91  Id. 
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subsequent concessions, and by not providing proper compensation, which 
has led to decreased food security and increased hunger.  In addition, this 
particular LSLBI has proved inadequate in helping individuals to access 
food through the first channel of employment, due to the precarious nature 
of contract labor at the sugar plantation.  Contractors report that rain can 
impede their ability to work, leaving them without money for food.92 
The example from Koh Kong shows how large-scale agricultural 
investment can result in violations of the right to food of local people, 
leaving them far worse off than before, despite the promise of development 
for the country.  Moreover, the protracted litigation surrounding the Koh 
Kong sugar plantation illustrates the problems that can arise for investors 
and the companies they supply when care is not taken to avoid human rights 
abuses.  Conversely, investments structured in a way that safeguard human 
rights can reduce the risk of social conflict with communities.93 
Some of the criticisms levied at LSLBI relate to the fundamental nature 
of the investment itself, with arguments that this type of investment is never 
appropriate.  Other critiques, however, concern the structure, 
implementation, and subsequent impacts of the investment.  One significant 
way to shape investments, and thus their impacts, is through law and 
regulation.  Part II explores the investment and human rights legal regimes in 
which LSLBI operates. 
II.  GOVERNANCE AND PROTECTIONS UNDER INVESTMENT LAW AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
International and domestic legal frameworks shape corporate 
agricultural investment and its impacts on human rights, including the right 
to food.  Treaties, national laws and policies, and contracts create a complex 
governance structure that has implications for how such investment is 
undertaken, as well as how the interests of stakeholders—in particular, 
corporate investors and individuals affected by the investment—are 
protected.  Specific legal rules and agreements can influence the potential 
right-to-food impacts of agricultural investment by encouraging or 
prohibiting certain actions tied to an investment.  Less obvious, but perhaps 
of greater significance, is the effect rendered by overlapping investment and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92  Id. 
93  For an interesting discussion of the risks for companies of undertaking investments 
without addressing insecure land rights within the local community, see MUNDEN PROJECT & 
RTS. & RESOURCES INITIATIVE, THE FINANCIAL RISKS OF INSECURE LAND TENURE: AN 
INVESTMENT VIEW (Dec. 2012), 
http://www.rightsandresources.org/documents/files/doc_5715.pdf. 
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human rights legal frameworks.  Particularly at the international level, this 
fractured legal system provides deeply imbalanced legal protections for 
corporations and individuals.  This imbalance, in turn, provides reasons for 
governments to favor certain legal obligations over others, fails to 
incentivize corporations to undertake rights-respective investment, and 
leaves individuals whose rights are affected by investments without robust 
means of redress. 
Part II provides an overview of relevant international and human rights 
legal regimes.  We consider the structure and roles of international and 
domestic investment law and contracts, as well as international, regional, and 
domestic human rights law.  In addition, Part II describes some of the recent 
international human rights and investment law developments that seek to 
address current weaknesses in the systems.  Examining these investment and 
human rights regimes can help shed light on the rules governing foreign 
agricultural investment, the implications for the right to food and other 
human rights in the context of such investment, and the ways that host and 
home states can seek to address current regime deficiencies. 
A. Investment Law 
Both international and domestic investment law play an important role 
in shaping LSLBI and its corresponding impacts.  These laws determine 
investor protections and state obligations towards investors.  This can dictate 
how governments regulate LSLBI as well as the limitations that 
governments may confront when seeking to change the parameters of such 
regulation.  Further, investment law is instrumental in determining how 
investment disputes are settled.  In addition to international and domestic 
law, investment contracts negotiated primarily between states and investors 
play a pivotal role in some jurisdictions in setting the terms of an investment.  
These legal rules and agreements may have implications for a government’s 
ability or willingness to meet its right-to-food obligations in the context of 
LSLBI.  In particular, if a LSLBI limits individuals’ access to food––
whether through loss of livelihood or loss of subsistence farming––without 
providing an adequate alternative means of access, the investment may affect 
the right to food.  In such situations, the investment regime may constrain a 
state’s response regarding redress of the negative right-to-food impacts. 
1. International Investment Law and Arbitration 
International investment law is governed by a complex regime of 
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international investment agreements (IIAs).94  IIAs primarily take the form 
of bilateral investment treaties (BITs), or investment chapters within broader 
economic agreements.95  Unlike the international trade law regime, there is 
no single multilateral agreement that regulates international investment.96  
The original impetus behind the development of IIAs was the protection of 
developed nations’ investors abroad.97  By the end of 2013, the number of 
IIAs had reached over 3000.98 
A primary rationale for IIAs is that they protect and promote 
investment, which leads to increased capital and technology flows into 
recipient countries, as well as overall economic development.99  The treaties 
offer a number of substantive protections for investors but generally do not 
impose obligations on them.100  Of note, these treaties generally do not 
provide protections to governments, nor do they provide any protections to 
individuals whose rights are affected by investments.  The rights afforded to 
investors have significant ramifications, and at times limit the ability of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94  Also known as investment treaties. 
95  See JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 1-3 (2010); Jeswald W. 
Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 427, 428-29 
(2010) [hereinafter Emerging Global Regime]. 
96  See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 11 (2d ed., 2012); Freya Baetens, Gerard Kreijen & Andrea Varga, 
Determining International Responsibility Under the New Extra-EU Investment Agreements: 
What Foreign Investors in the EU Should Know, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1203, 1207-208 
(2014). 
97  BITs began to emerge in the late 1950s and early 1960s. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, 
supra note 966, at 6-11; Baetens, Kreijen & Varga, supra note 966, at 1207-08; LUKE ERIC 
PETERSON, RIGHTS & DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: 
MAPPING THE ROLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW WITHIN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 12 (2009), 
http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/dd-rd/E84-36-2009-eng.pdf. For a 
discussion that suggests that the purpose of investment treaties is to protect and promote 
investment, see Salacuse, Emerging Global Regime, supra note 95, at 427-28. 
98  As reported in the UNCTAD, 2014 UNCTAD WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 201 – 
INVESTING IN THE SDGS: AN ACTION PLAN 19 (2014), 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2014_overview_en.pdf. 
99  Baetens, Kreijen & Varga, supra note 96, at 1209 (referencing the U.S., Netherlands, 
German, and French Model BITs); Emerging Global Regime, supra note 95, at 441. 
100  Mann, supra note 19, 132-33. Some of the most common rights afforded to investors 
include protection on the basis of the principles of national treatment, most-favored-nation 
treatment, no expropriation without compensation, and fair and equitable treatment—an 
elastic concept depending on the interpreter. Id.; Emerging Global Regime, supra note 955, at 
445; Baetens, Kreijen & Varga, supra note 966, at 1209-10. For a discussion on the 
application of each of these principles, see DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 966; PETERSON, 
supra note 97, at 13. 
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governments to legislate or create policy.101  Limitations on public 
policymaking space can present a significant problem in terms of 
governments meeting their right-to-food obligations.  As the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) explains in its General 
Comment No. 12, “violations of the right to food can occur through the 
direct action of . . . entities insufficiently regulated by States.”  This can 
include through “the failure of a State to take into account its international 
legal obligations regarding the right to food when entering into agreements 
with other States or with international organizations.”102  When investment 
treaties do not carve out investor-protection exceptions for state action taken 
to address the right to food or other human rights, the right to food is 
violated to the extent that such treaties prevent the state from sufficiently 
regulating investors to prevent right-to-food abuses. 
IIAs are concluded between states, but usually include a provision for 
investor-state arbitration, through which investors are able to initiate arbitral 
proceedings against the host state for alleged treaty breaches.103  The dispute 
settlement mechanism provided by investor-state arbitration is grounded in 
ad hoc arbitration panels, rather than a standing dispute settlement body, 
with no general appellate mechanism.  As such, inconsistency in arbitral 
awards can result.104  Inconsistency may be exacerbated by the lack of 
transparency around many dispute proceedings.105  And because these ad 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101  See, e.g., CARIN SMALLER, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (IISD), THE IISD GUIDE 
TO NEGOTIATING INVESTMENT CONTRACTS FOR FARMLAND AND WATER 6 (Nov. 2014), 
https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/iisd-guide-negotiating-investment-
contracts-farmland-water_1.pdf (referring to NATHALIE BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER, AARON 
COSBEY, LISE JOHNSON & DAMON VIS-DUNBAR, IISD, INVESTMENT TREATIES AND WHY THEY 
MATTER TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (2011), 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2011/investment_treaties_why_they_matter_sd.pdf; also referring to 
Carin Smaller & Howard Mann, Foreign Land Purchases for Agriculture: What Impact on 
Sustainable Development? (U.N., Sustainable Development Innovation Briefs No. 8, Jan. 
2010), http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/resources/res_pdfs/publications/ib/no8.pdf). 
102  General Comment No. 12, supra note 36, ¶ 19. 
103  This is arguably the most important of the various decision-making procedures as it is 
the primary mechanism for enforcement. See Emerging Global Regime, supra note 95, at 459-
64 (discussing investor-state arbitration). See also Baetens, Kreijen & Varga, supra note 966, 
at 1210. For a recent media article outlining the controversies surrounding investor-state 
dispute settlement, see Investor-State Dispute Settlement: The Arbitration Game, ECONOMIST 
(Oct. 11, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21623756-
governments-are-souring-treaties-protect-foreign-investors-arbitration. 
104  Baetens, Kreijen & Varga, supra note 966, at 1209-11. 
105  Rules are generally silent on whether confidentiality is required. The United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Rules on Transparency in Treaty-
based Investor-State Arbitration, which became effective in April 2014, seek to generate 
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hoc tribunals arise in a fragmented international investment system 
comprised of BITs, regional cooperation arrangements, and multilateral 
conventions, application of the investment system’s rules can lead to 
“confusion, legal conflict, and uncertainty.”106 
Investment treaty arbitration has exploded in recent years as a favored 
avenue of recourse for investors.107  The costs of running arbitration 
proceedings are significant and are commonly born by the parties 
irrespective of outcome, which can impose significant burdens on states.108  
In addition to the procedural costs, compensation awards can be extremely 
high.109  Aside from the potential high awards, investors may also favor 
investment treaty arbitration for other reasons.  Investment treaty arbitration 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
greater transparency over investment arbitration. However, the applicability of these rules is 
limited; they only apply to disputes arising out of treaties concluded after the rules came into 
force when the arbitration is initiated under UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or when parties 
agree to their application. UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State 
Arbitration, U.N. COMMISSION ON INT’L TRADE L., 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2014Transparency.html (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2016). 
106  Rafael Leal-Arcas, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law, 35 N.C. J. 
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 33, 124 (2009) (citation omitted). 
107  International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) currently has 209 
cases pending and records a total number of 349 concluded cases. Cases, INT’L CTR. FOR 
SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISP., 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/AdvancedSearch.aspx?cs=CD27 
(last visited Jan. 20, 2016). 
108  A 2014 Allen & Overy study of arbitration cases calculated that the average party costs 
for claimants was US$4,437,000 and US$4,559,000 for respondents (states). The median 
costs were, however, lower at US$3,145,000 for claimants and US$2,286,000 for 
respondents. Tribunal costs came to just over US$373,200 for each party. Matthew Hodgson, 




109  The Allen & Overy study found an average award amount of US$76,331,000 in cases 
where the claimant (investor) was successful. This amount was substantially distorted by the 
combined value of particularly high awards in four cases, which together totaled 
approximately US$3.12 billion. Yet even the median amount awarded was US$10,694,000. 
Id. After that study was published, the largest award to date, some $50 billion, was made 
against Russia in favor of OAO Yukos Oil Company in three UNCITRAL arbitral tribunal 
awards. Martin Dietrich Brauch, Yukos v. Russia: Issues and Legal Reasoning Behind US$50 
Billion Awards, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Sept. 4, 2014), 
https://www.iisd.org/itn/2014/09/04/yukos-v-russia-issues-and-legal-reasoning-behind-us50-
billion-awards/. 
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enables investors to circumvent domestic courts.110  This may be preferable 
for investors who have more confidence in arbitral panels than in the 
national court system of the host state, even though investment arbitration 
has none of the checks and balances frequently found in domestic 
jurisdictions.  Further, unlike most domestic courts, proceedings and awards 
can be kept confidential.  Moreover, the fragmented international investment 
system creates room for investors to take advantage of current system 
weaknesses, including by treaty shopping to find a more favorable forum,111 
or by bringing simultaneous claims in more than one forum.112  In addition, 
investment treaty arbitration affords investors the opportunity to bring 
claims—a unique right that is not provided to host governments or to 
individuals whose rights may be affected by the investor’s actions—in a 
forum generally uninterested in the human rights dimensions of a situation. 
Indeed, arbitral tribunals have shown little interest in considering the human 
rights implications of an investor’s operations or the human rights defenses 
asserted by the state.  The relevance of human rights in investor-state dispute 
settlement is considered in greater detail in Part II.C.2 of this Article. 
With respect to agricultural investment and the right to food, the main 
risk presented by this system is that host governments may feel constrained 
in addressing the negative right-to-food impacts of foreign LSLBI.  
Regulatory or other action that aims to counter negative consequences could 
potentially give rise to a treaty-based claim if it affects a protected investor’s 
rights.  This “regulatory chill”113 may render a government less willing to 
take necessary steps to prevent or mitigate an investment’s negative impact 
on the right to food. 
When a concession has been granted for land that individuals rely on for 
their food production or livelihoods, investment operations may push land 
users off the land, with detrimental impacts on their right to food.  A 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110  See PETERSON, supra note 97, at 17 (describing how investors may avoid taking 
disputes to a host state’s national courts and contrasting this with the international human 
rights law system that requires exhaustion of national remedies).  The international human 
right law section is discussed in Part II.B.1 below. On page 18 of PETERSON, there is a useful 
table setting out the main difference between investor-state arbitration proceedings and 
regional human rights mechanisms.  Id. at 18. 
111  Leal-Arcas, supra note 106, at 37; see also PETERSON, supra note 97, at 15. 
112  See FIONA MARSHALL, INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., RISKS FOR HOST STATES OF THE 
ENTWINING OF INVESTMENT TREATY AND CONTRACT CLAIMS: DISPUTE RESOLUTION CLAUSES, 
UMBRELLA CLAUSES, AND FORKS-IN-THE-ROAD (Aug. 2009), 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2009/best_practices_bulletin_4.pdf. 
113  OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER, A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH TO TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
POLICIES 14 (Nov. 2008), http://www.iatp.org/files/451_2_104504.pdf. 
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government seeking to remedy these negative impacts may conclude that 
additional procedural protections should be implemented before an investor 
expands its operations within the concession area.114  Yet such a step could 
potentially violate its obligations under an investment treaty, paving the way 
for the investor to seek recourse through arbitration.  The possibility of 
arbitration could dissuade the government from taking steps to protect the 
land users. 
2. Domestic Law 
Domestic law that relates to investment is “exceptionally diverse” and 
jurisdiction-specific.115  It comprises all laws, regulations, administrative 
decrees, and judicial decisions of a state that concern topics connected to 
investment, including tax, land governance, water rights, and environmental 
laws.116  For example, how a country defines property rights and contractual 
rights through its law is critically relevant for investment.117  In addition, 
many countries have a specific investment law, which usually plays the dual 
role of both encouraging and controlling foreign investment.118  For 
example, a common investment promotion strategy is to offer investors 
financial incentives and tax breaks through laws and regulations.119  In some 
countries the investment law may be more developed than environmental or 
human rights laws, affording investors stronger rights and protections than 
those provided to individuals affected by investment.120  If there is 
inconsistency or conflict between international investment law and domestic 
law, the international law prevails.121 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114  This example is currently playing out in Liberia, as the government grapples with how 
to address community concerns related to their customary rights to land over which 
agricultural concessions have already been awarded. Kaitlin Cordes, Making Agricultural 
Investments Work for Land Users & Communities, FOCUS ON LAND IN AFRICA, 
http://www.focusonland.com/fola/en/for-comment/making-agricultural-investments-work-for-
communities/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2016). 
115  JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE THREE LAWS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT: NATIONAL, 
CONTRACTUAL, AND INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR FOREIGN CAPITAL 35 (2013). 
116  Id.; SMALLER, supra note 101, at 5; Investment Law, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE 
DEV., https://www.iisd.org/investment/law/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2016). 
117  SALACUSE, supra note 115, at 37. 
118  Id. at 36. 
119  CARIN SMALLER, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., INVESTMENT CONTRACTS FOR 
FARMLAND AND WATER: TEN STEPS ¶ 5 (Apr. 2013), 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2013/investment_contracts_farmland_en.pdf. 
120  SMALLER, supra note 1011, at 5. 
121  Howard Mann, Foreign Investment in Agriculture: Some Critical Contract Issues, 17 
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The balance struck between encouraging and controlling foreign 
investment varies from country to country and may change over time within 
a given jurisdiction, depending on a country’s current priorities.122  To 
promote investment, countries often create state obligations and investor 
rights under domestic law, similar to international investment law.  In some 
cases, domestic law may go even further than investment treaties by 
providing greater investor protections than those offered in treaties.  One 
example is the draft Investment Law in Myanmar.  If enacted, the new law 
would consolidate and replace the existing Foreign Investment Law and the 
Myanmar Citizens Investment Law.123  As currently drafted, the law would 
likely provide even greater investor protections, including more 
opportunities for investment dispute procedures, than existing applicable 
investment treaties.  These strong investor rights are bolstered by weak 
protections for communities, raising serious concerns about the rights of 
local individuals versus investors.  In this respect, the International 
Commission of Jurists has expressed that it “remains concerned that the 
Draft Investment Law establishes significant rights for investors without 
protecting the rights of those affected by business activity.”124  Indeed, the 
draft law fails to provide local people with a means for redress if an 
investment goes wrong, and would potentially limit the government’s ability 
to regulate to protect human rights, such as the right to food.125  The 
international debate over the draft law highlights the significant role that 
domestic investment laws may play in contributing to the imbalance of 
protections between investors and communities whose human rights are 
affected by LSLBI. 
3. Investment Contracts 
In the case of state-owned land, investment contracts are entered into 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
UNIF. L. REV. 129, 133 (2012). 
122  SALACUSE, supra note 115, at 36. 
123  See Myanmar The Investment Law of 2015, Consolidating and Replacing The 
Myanmar Citizens Investment Law, Pyidaungsu Htluttaw Law No. 18 of 29 July 2013 and 
The Foreign Investment Law, Pyidaungsu Htluttaw Law No. 21, 2012, 2 November 2012 and 
Associated Regulations (MIC/DICA Draft V.2 Feb. 24, 2015), 
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/2015-Myanmar-Investment-Bill-V2-24-02-2015.pdf; 
Burma: Address Rights Impact of New Investment Law, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar. 26, 2015), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/03/25/burma-address-rights-impact-new-investment-law. 
124  Myanmar’s Investment Law Drafting Process at Critical Phase, INT’L COMM’N JURISTS 
(Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.icj.org/myanmars-investment-law-drafting-process-at-critical-
phase/. 
125  See id. 
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directly between the state and the investor.  In addition to the protections 
afforded to foreign investors by IIAs and domestic investment law, most 
investment contracts also offer investors a number of rights and protections.  
As opposed to most IIAs, such contracts also impose obligations on the 
investor, as well as provide rights for the government as a contracting party. 
Investment contracts can either be written to be subject to or to override 
domestic law.126  Within the context of the international investment legal 
regime, contractual content is quite important, as some arbitral tribunals 
have held that investors can bring investment treaty claims against host 
states based solely on an alleged breach of an investment contract, rather 
than a breach of the investment treaty.127 
The negotiation and design of investment contracts can have a number 
of human rights implications.128  Some contractual provisions help ensure 
that states are better able to protect against potential human rights abuses, 
while other provisions instead potentially limit a state’s ability to meet its 
human rights obligations.  An example of the latter is the stabilization 
clause.129  At their most extreme, stabilization clauses can effectively freeze 
the regulatory framework that applies to the investment.130  Overly broad 
stabilization clauses can therefore render subsequent changes to the domestic 
legal framework, including improved human rights or labor regulations, 
inapplicable to the investment.  This may lead an investor to informally rely 
on the stabilization clause to ignore a new law or may give the investor a 
formal claim for compensation if forced to comply.131  For example, an 
investor that has signed a contract with a “full freezing” stabilization clause 
might refuse to abide by a new minimum wage law imposed by the state, 
even if the increased minimum wage was designed in part to help workers 
realize their right to food.132  If forced to comply, the investor theoretically 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126  Investment Law, supra note 116. 
127  MARSHALL, supra note 112, at 9-11. 
128  See, e.g., John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary General), Principles for 
Responsible Contracts: Integrating the Management of Human Rights Risks into State-
Investor Contract Negotiations: Guidance for Negotiators, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31/Add.3 
(May 25, 2011), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/A.HRC.17.31.Add.3.pdf. 
129  Id. ¶¶ 31-9. 
130  This would be a “full freezing clause.” See INT’L FIN. CORP. (IFC), STABILIZATION 
CLAUSES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 6 (May 27, 2009), 
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/9feb5b00488555eab8c4fa6a6515bb18/Stabilization%2
BPaper.pdf?MOD=AJPERES. 
131  Id. at 33-36. 
132  The IFC report provides the following example of a full freezing stabilization clause 
from a Sub-Saharan extractive agreement concluded in the 2000s: 
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might have an arbitration claim against the state under an applicable 
investment treaty, arguing breach of the umbrella clause, fair and equitable 
treatment, or the prohibition against expropriation.  Whether an arbitral 
panel would accept this argument is unclear.  Yet, “a number of arbitral 
decisions have pointed to the relevance of stabilization clauses” in such 
circumstances.133 
The current international investment law regime, coupled with domestic 
investment laws and investor-state contracts that afford additional rights to 
investors, can result in an unbalanced playing field for investors and those 
affected by investments, including LSLBI.  This web of investor rights 
provides very strong protections to investors, particularly foreign investors, 
who are protected by IIAs and may receive additional rights and protections 
under domestic investment laws or investor-state contracts.134  At the same 
time, the investment regime in some cases can limit the ability of states to 
adequately protect human rights, including in situations where land 
investments impede the realization of individuals’ right to food.  And where 
there are weak domestic laws and poor institutional enforcement capacity, 
the rights of foreign investors derived from IIAs and investment contracts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
The GOVERNMENT hereby undertakes and affirms that at no time shall the 
rights (and the full and peaceful enjoyment thereof) granted by it under this 
Agreement be derogated from or otherwise prejudiced by any Law or by the 
action or inaction of the GOVERNMENT, or any official thereof, or any other 
Person whose actions or inactions are subject to the control of the 
GOVERNMENT. In particular, any modifications that could be made in the 
future to the Law as an effect on the Effective Date shall not apply to the 
CONCESSIONAIRE and its Associates without their prior written consent, but 
the CONCESSIONAIRE and its Associates may at any time elect to be 
governed by the legal and regulatory provisions resulting from changes made at 
any time in the Law as in effect on the Effective Date. 
In the event of any conflict between this Agreement or the rights, obligations 
and duties of a Party under this Agreement, and any other Law, including 
administrative rules and procedures and matters relating to procedure, and 
applicable international law, then this Agreement shall govern the rights, 
obligations, and duties of the Parties. 
 Id. at 6. 
133  Id. at 36. 
134  See, e.g., CARIN SMALLER & HOWARD MANN, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., A 
THIRST FOR DISTANT LANDS: FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN AGRICULTURAL LAND AND WATER 14 
(May 2009), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2009/thirst_for_distant_lands.pdf (noting that 
investment contracts may provide “additional rights not set out in domestic law relating to 
water use, land tenure rights, the right to export all products of the investment, etc. In 
addition, a foreign investor may obtain favourable taxation terms and other economic 
incentives available under domestic law to foreign investors.”). 
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can easily take precedence over the rights of local communities.135  This is 
exacerbated by the investment regime’s failure to offer individuals affected 
by investment any avenue for recourse, leaving their claims to the human 
rights legal regime. 
B. Human Rights Law 
Human rights legal obligations exist at three different levels: 
international, regional, and domestic.  The international human rights law 
regime has been instrumental in developing the normative framework 
surrounding the right to food, and placing obligations on states to respect, 
protect, and fulfill this right.  However, these obligations can be difficult to 
enforce, and the international human rights system does not always offer 
adequate mechanisms for redress.  This is especially true in the case of 
socio-economic rights, including the right to food.  Regional systems create 
additional or overlapping obligations and provide another redress 
opportunity for victims of right-to-food abuses but similarly can be limited 
in their functionality. In some jurisdictions domestic human rights law offers 
the strongest mode of rights protection, however, only a minority of 
countries have enshrined the right to food as a justiciable right.  All three 
levels of human rights law create governmental obligations, as well as 
redress mechanisms available to victims.  These rights regimes are relevant 
when considering what governments can and should do to ensure that LSLBI 
does not violate human rights, including the right to food. 
1. International Human Rights Law 
The international human rights legal regime comprises customary 
international law, international conventions, international declarations, and 
Human Rights Council decisions and resolutions.136  Of these, international 
covenants and treaties are legally binding upon those states that ratify 
them,137 while customary international law automatically binds all states.  
Other sources of international law, such as declarations and treaty body 
comments and resolutions, though not legally binding, still provide 
authoritative interpretations of binding obligations.  The international legal 
status of the right to food is set out above in Part II.A. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135  See id. at 8. 
136  See Human Rights Council, U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTS, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/HRCIndex.aspx (last visited Jan. 20, 2016). 
137  Ratification and accession have the same legal effect.  Ratification simply occurs 
before the Covenant has come into force, whereas accession occurs once the Covenant 
already obtains the requisite number of signatures and has come into force. 
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While international human rights law is vital for the development of 
human rights norms, it is limited in the protections it offers to those affected 
by LSLBI, especially for violations of socio-economic rights like the right to 
food.138  When a violation of international human rights law occurs, the 
remedy available to the individual whose right has been violated depends on 
the source of the obligation.  For example, the geopolitical context in which 
the modern international human rights regime developed led to two distinct 
international treaties, one covering civil and political rights, the other 
covering economic, social and cultural rights.  These treaties, in turn, have 
their own remedial instruments.  An individual alleging the breach of a civil 
or political right may, after having exhausted all domestic avenues, appeal to 
the Human Rights Committee if the violating state has ratified the Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR 
Optional Protocol).139  An individual claiming a breach of an economic, 
social or cultural right, such as the right to food, may instead lodge a 
communication with the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (CESCR) against the relevant state, so long as the state has ratified 
the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR Optional Protocol).140 
The ICESCR Optional Protocol is relatively new, having opened for 
signature in 2009141 and entered into force on May 5, 2013142––nearly 40 
years after the ICCPR Optional Protocol.  It currently has 45 signatories and 
20 parties.143  Under the protocol, all rights set out in the ICESCR can be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138  ANSEEUW ET AL., supra note 12, at 8, 64. 
139  Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened 
for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/OPCCPR1.aspx. [hereinafter ICCPR 
Optional Protocol]. 
140  For an explanation of how the ICESCR Optional Protocol works, see Irene Biglino & 
Christophe Golay, The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (Geneva Academy, Academy In-Brief No. 2, July 2013), 
http://www.geneva-
academy.ch/docs/publications/The%20optional%20protocol%20In%20brief%202.pdf. 
141  Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, opened for signature Sept. 24, 2009, U.N. Doc. A/63/435 (entered into force May 5, 
2013), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/OPCESCR.aspx. [hereinafter 
ICESCR Optional Protocol]. 
142  Id. at art. 18, ¶ 1. 
143  See 3.a Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3-
a&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Jan. 20, 2016). 
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invoked before the CESCR,144 including the right to food.  Similar to other 
UN treaty bodies, recommendations of the CESCR in relation to the 
communication are not binding judgments,145 although the ratified ICESCR 
remains binding upon states.  Thus, while this mechanism possesses 
important international normative value, its ability to provide enforceable 
remedies for violations of the right to food in the context of LSLBI may be 
limited.  As a result, although individuals could use the ICESCR Optional 
Protocol in certain situations to raise complaints about a violation of the 
right to food resulting from a LSLBI, there is no guarantee that doing so 
would lead to adequate redress. 
Another international human rights process meant to increase 
accountability is the Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review 
(UPR).146  Under the UPR process, member states systematically review 
every state’s human rights record.147  Each state first declares its efforts to 
fulfill its rights obligations,148 which is then reviewed by other member 
states.  NGOs are also permitted to submit information through an “other 
stakeholders” report,149 and so may report on situations where communities 
are going hungry due to a LSLBI that cut off means to access food.150  
While the UPR enables greater scrutiny of a country’s human rights record, 
the process has no legal effect and is not an avenue of redress for individuals 
whose right to food has been breached in the context of LSLBI. 
2. Regional Human Rights Law 
In certain regions, individuals whose right to food has been violated 
may have recourse to regional human rights bodies.  Each regional human 
rights system has its own set of treaties, complaints mechanisms (including 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144  ICESCR Optional Protocol, supra note 141, art. 2. 
145  Biglino & Golay, supra note 140, at 35. 
146  Universal Periodic Review, U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTS., 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRMain.aspx (last visited Jan. 20, 2016). 
147  See Basic Facts About the UPR, U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTS., 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/BasicFacts.aspx (last visited Jan. 20, 2016). 
148  Universal Periodic Review, supra note 146. 
149  See Basic Facts About the UPR, supra note 14747. 
150  See, e.g., INT’L FED. HUM. RTS. & LAO MOVEMENT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, JOINT UPR 
SUBMISSION LAO PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 21ST SESSION (Jan.-Feb. 2015), 
https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/20140615_lao_pdr_upr__submission_en.pdf; see also 
INDONESIA: UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW (UPR) STAKEHOLDERS’ SUBMISSION TO THE 13TH 
SESSION OF THE UPR WORKING GROUP (21ST MAY – 1ST JUNE 2012) (Nov. 21, 2011), 
http://www.downtoearth-indonesia.org/sites/downtoearth-
indonesia.org/files/Submission%20Report%20to%20Human%20Rights%20Council1.pdf. 
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courts and commissions) and rules of procedure.151  Some of these regions––
for example, Africa and the Americas––have protected the right to food, or 
closely related rights, in legally binding regional instruments.152  When the 
right to food has been either codified in a relevant regional treaty or 
interpreted into a treaty, the corresponding complaints mechanism can be 
used to raise allegations of a violation of the right.  These complaints 
mechanisms offer justice and reparation for individuals who have suffered 
human rights violations by a state party.153  As with the international human 
rights system, regional human rights systems can only hold states 
accountable for human rights violations.154 
These regional commissions and courts function as a supplement, rather 
than an alternative, to national courts, generally requiring individuals to 
exhaust domestic remedies before proceeding.  To take the Inter-American 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151  For the treaties, see Regional Human Rights Treaties, U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH 
COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTS., 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/ESCR/Pages/RegionalHRTreaties.aspx (last visited Jan. 20, 
2016). 
152  In Africa, the right to food is reflected in articles 14 and 15 of the Protocol to the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa and article 
14 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. See Protocol to the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, supra note 40.  
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has also recognized the right to food 
as implicitly guaranteed in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights through 
various interdependent rights, such as the rights to health and education.  See Social and 
Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and Center for Economic and Social Rights (CSR) 
v. Nigeria, 155/96, ¶¶ 64-66 (Oct. 27, 2001) (referring to African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter), ¶ 4, 16, 22, 
adopted June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986), 
http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/).  In the Americas, the right to food is recognized in 
article 12 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the 
Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and has been indirectly recognized in the 
American Convention on Human Rights through interdependent rights, such as the rights to 
life and recognition of dignity.  See Organization of American States, American Convention 
on Human Rights (San Jose Pact), Nov. 22 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 
http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights.htm.  The 
right to food is not yet enshrined in the European system.  See CHRISTOPHE GOLAY, FAO, THE 
RIGHT TO FOOD AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE: EXAMPLES AT THE NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL LEVELS 37-38 (2009), http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/k7286e/k7286e.pdf; 
Narula, supra note 38, at 789-90; Irene Biglino & Christophe Golay, Human Rights 
Responses to Land Grabbing: A Right to Food Perspective, 34 THIRD WORLD Q. 1630, 1643-
44 (2013). 
153  Regional Systems, INT’L JUSTICE RESOURCE CTR., http://www.ijrcenter.org/regional/ 
(last visited Jan. 20, 2016). 
154  GOLAY, supra note 152. 
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system as an example, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
can decide complaints alleging a violation of the American Declaration of 
the Rights and Duties of Man or the American Convention on Human Rights 
(American Convention) against member states of the Organization of 
American States.  This jurisdiction exists when the state that is the subject of 
the complaint has ratified the Convention;155 domestic remedies must have 
been exhausted and the subject cannot be pending in another international 
proceeding.156  Cases decided by the Commission may also be referred to 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, but only where the state against 
which the violation is claimed has recognized the Court’s jurisdiction. 
Like the international human rights system, regional rights systems help 
drive the development of human rights norms and provide some recourse for 
victims of rights abuses.  However, the recourse provided by the regional 
rights systems and the enforceability of decisions can be limited.  Thus, 
although individuals who have suffered right-to-food or other abuses due to 
LSLBI can seek redress through available regional mechanisms, there are no 
guarantees that such mechanisms will provide adequate redress.  Aside from 
the domestic exhaustion requirements, which can be onerous and time-
consuming, the decisions of regional commissions are not always enforced, 
relying primarily on a country’s willingness to comply with an unfavorable 
ruling.  Compared to international investment law, which generally does not 
require domestic exhaustion and has a stronger enforcement mechanism, the 
international and regional human rights regimes offer much weaker 
protections for victims of right-to-food abuses than those provided by the 
investment regime to investors. 
3. Domestic Human Rights Law 
Domestic systems are the third level of law at which human rights are 
protected.  In some countries, the right to food is protected in a constitution 
or through a framework law.  Constitutional recognition of the right to food 
may take various forms, including direct recognition, inclusion as a directive 
principle, and recognition through judicial interpretation of other human 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155  Id. 
156  An exception to the requirement of domestic exhaustion is made when “(a) the 
domestic legislation of the state concerned does not afford due process of law for the 
protection of the right or rights that have allegedly been violated; (b) the party alleging 
violation of his rights has been denied access to the remedies under domestic law or has been 
prevented from exhausting them; or (c) there has been unwarranted delay in rendering a final 
judgment under the aforementioned remedies.” American Convention on Human Rights, 
supra note 152, art. 46, ¶ 2. 
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rights.157  In the first category, countries explicitly recognize the right to 
food for all people or for specified groups, such as children, or refer to the 
right to food as part of another human right, such as the right to an adequate 
standard of living.158  As an example of the former, the South African 
Constitution provides, “[e]veryone has the right to have access to . . . 
sufficient food.”159  Although codification of the right to food in the 
substantive part of a constitution facilitates review of state activity affecting 
the right,160 explicit constitutional enshrinement of the right to food is not 
yet the norm.161  Another type of constitutional recognition is inclusion as a 
directive principle that is aspirational in nature and intended to guide 
governmental action.162  For example, article 15(a) of the Bangladesh 
Constitution provides that it is the “fundamental responsibility of the State to 
attain . . . a steady improvement in the material and cultural standard of 
living of the people, with a view to securing to its citizens . . . the provision 
of the basic necessities of life, including food.”163  However, directive 
principles are rarely justiciable.  Finally, the right to food may be recognized 
through judicial interpretation of other constitutionally recognized human 
rights, such as the right to life.164  An example of this is found in India, 
which is discussed below.  Aside from where the right is placed in the 
constitutional text, local factors—such as the independence of the judiciary, 
the nature of judicial review, and whether a country has a civil or common 
law legal tradition—help determine the legal nature of a constitutionally 
enshrined right.165 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157  LIDIJA KNUTH & MARGRET VIDAR, FAO, CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL PROTECTION OF 
THE RIGHT TO FOOD AROUND THE WORLD 14 (2011), 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/ap554e/ap554e.pdf. For a breakdown of the countries that 
recognized the right to food in the four categories in 2011, see id. at 21-22. 
158  Id. at 14-16; JOSÉ MARÍA MEDINA REY & MARIA TERESA DE FEBRER, FAO, THE RIGHT 
TO FOOD WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND COUNTRY 
CONSTITUTIONS 11 (2014), http://www.fao.org/3/a-i3448e.pdf. 
159  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, art. 27, 
http://www.gov.za/documents/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996. 
160  REY & FEBRER, supra note 158, at 11. 
161  Courtney Jung, Ran Hirschl & Evan Rosevear, Economic and Social Rights in National 
Constitutions, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 1043, 1088, 1053-4 (2014) (finding that “[t]he rights to land 
and to food and water are . . . relatively rare, present in less than one-quarter, and justiciable 
in about one-tenth, of the world’s constitutions.”). 
162  Id. at 18. 
163  Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 1972 (reinst. 1986), art. 15, 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research/bangladesh-constitution.pdf. 
164  KNUTH & VIDAR, supra note 157, at 19-20. 
165  For a discussion of the impact of legal traditions, as well as a discussion of the 
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In addition to or instead of codifying the right to food in a constitution, 
some countries enact legislation focused specifically on the right to food or 
food security.  In certain cases, this may open up avenues for those affected 
by LSLBI to seek redress.  FAO advocates the implementation of a 
framework law166 to, among other things, define the right to food, and 
provide means for enforcement of the right.167  Countries such as Nicaragua, 
Brazil, and Guatemala have enacted this type of law.168  Other variations 
include relevant sector-specific legislation, such as in the areas of fishing or 
the environment.169  Framework laws have numerous benefits, including 
making governmental actors accountable for right-to-food violations, placing 
the right to food at the center of development strategies, and clarifying and 
strengthening countries’ negotiating positions relating to trade and 
investment.170  When legislation is implemented and enforced, each of these 
benefits may lead to more rights-consistent investment.  As with 
constitutional protection, however, framework legislation is not yet 
common, and the impact of such a law relies on a country’s ability and 
willingness to consistently enforce it. 
Domestic legal frameworks combining constitutional guarantees with 
specific legislation related to the right to food can be particularly powerful.  
One example where the right to food was interpreted as flowing from 
another constitutional right, and where legislation was enacted in response, 
is found in India.  In People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, a 
writ petition was filed with the Supreme Court of India seeking a direction 
that the State and Central Governments meet their obligations to release 
stored foodgrains to India’s starving people.171  The Supreme Court heard 
the petition on the basis of public interest law and found that the right to life, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
justiciability of economic and social rights more broadly, see Jung, Hirschl & Rosevear, supra 
note 161. 
166  Framework law meaning “a legislative technique used to address cross-sectoral issues.” 
KNUTH & VIDAR, supra note 157, at 30.  See also JOSÉ MARÍA MEDINA REY & MARIA TERESA 
DE FEBRER, FAO, DEVELOPMENT OF SPECIFIC RIGHT TO FOOD LEGISLATION 3 (2014), 
http://www.fao.org/3/a-i3449e.pdf. 
167  Id. at 2. 
168  Olivier De Schutter (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Countries Tackling 
Hunger with a Right to Food Approach 5 (U.N. Briefing Note No. 1, May 2010), 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/food/docs/Briefing_Note_01_May_2010_EN.pdf. 
169  Id. 
170  Id. at 5-6. 
171  Writ Petition (C) No.196/2001, People’s Union for Civil Liberties (Rajasthan) v. Union 
of India & Others (S.C. 2001), 
http://www.hrln.org/hrln/images/stories/pdf/Order%20of%2017%20September%202012-
Public%20Distribution%20System.pdf. 
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which was protected under the Constitution, entailed a minimum obligation 
of adequate nutrition.172  The Court ordered the distribution of the 
foodgrains and followed up with a series of interim orders, through which it 
“gradually defined the right to food in terms of what policies are required of 
the state and central governments in order for them to adequately fulfill their 
constitutional obligations under Article 21.”173  The Indian Government 
responded to the Court rulings with the enactment of the National Food 
Security Act of 2013.174  While the Act has been subject to criticism,175 and 
the expansive exercise of judicial power was somewhat unique,176 these 
efforts nonetheless demonstrate how domestic courts and legislatures are 
grappling with efforts to realize the right to food.  The Indian example also 
shows the power of domestic avenues for seeking remedies that are not 
available at the international or regional level. 
The right to food, however, is rarely justiciable.177  To date, most 
countries have not provided judicial avenues for individuals to allege a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172  For a discussion of the case, see Lauren Birchfield & Jessica Corsi, Between Starvation 
and Globalization: Realizing the Right to Food in India, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 691, 696 (2010). 
173  Id. at 700. 
174  This is also known as the Right to Food Act.  This is not the type of framework law that 
is discussed in this section; rather, it is a scheme directed at the provision of food to certain 
members of society. 
175  For a discussion of the proposed Bill prior to enactment, see Lauren Birchfield & 
Jessica Corsi, The Right to Life Is the Right to Food: People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. 
Union of India & Others, 17 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 15-18 (2010), 
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1128&context=hrbrief; 
Ravi S. Jha, India’s Food Security Bill: An Inadequate Remedy?, GUARDIAN (July 15, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2013/jul/15/india-
food-security-bill. 
176  For a discussion of the expansive role of India’s Supreme Court, see Manoj Mate, The 
Rise Of Judicial Governance in the Supreme Court of India, 33 BOSTON UNIV. INT’L L.J. 102 
(2015). 
177  For a discussion on justiciability and of the particular challenges regarding the right to 
food, see Christian Courtis, The Right to Food as a Justiciable Right: Challenges and 
Strategies, 11 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 317, 318, 321-6 (2007), 
http://www.mpil.de/files/pdf1/mpunyb_12_courtis_11.pdf.  For a discussion on the varying 
levels of justiciability of economic and social rights more broadly, see Jung, Hirschl & 
Rosevear, supra note 161.  For further discussion on the justiciability of economic and social 
rights, see Mark Tushnet, Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review, 82 TEX. L. 
REV. 1895 (June 2004); Varun Gauri & Daniel M. Brinks, The Elements of Legalization and 
the Triangular Shape of Social and Economic Rights, in COURTING SOCIAL JUSTICE 1-37 
(Varun Gauri & Daniel M. Brinks eds., 2008); SANDRA FREDMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS 
TRANSFORMED: POSITIVE RIGHTS AND POSITIVE DUTIES, 65-91 (2008); JEFF KING, JUDGING 
SOCIAL RIGHTS, 17-58 (2012). 
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violation of the right and request a remedy.  In South Africa, for example, 
the right to food is enshrined in the nation’s Constitution but there is not yet 
a legislative framework to implement it.  Further, there has been no 
successful litigation of the right.  Thus, even at the domestic level, there may 
be limited or no protection offered to individuals whose right to food is 
affected by LSLBI. 
Although some avenues of redress for right-to-food violations exist at 
the international, regional, and domestic levels, they generally face specific 
limitations or weaknesses.  None match the protections provided to investors 
under investment laws.  This imbalance between the protections provided to 
investors and to individuals whose rights have been violated is of particular 
concern to the extent that it could persuade states to prioritize their 
obligations to investors over those to protect and respect human rights.  In 
light of this imbalance and the general gaps in corporate accountability some 
developments have emerged recently at the international level in both human 
rights and investment law. 
C. Recent International Developments 
Efforts to ensure that investment occurs in a sustainable and rights-
responsive manner are being undertaken at the international level in both the 
human rights law and investment law fields.  With respect to international 
human rights law, interested parties have focused on the responsibilities and 
obligations of corporate actors, including through the development of 
guiding principles, a proposal for a new business and human rights treaty, 
and advocacy for a new business and human rights arbitration tribunal.  
Whether these last two options would cover violations of the right to food, 
however, remains to be seen.  In addition, specific guidance has been created 
to ensure that agricultural investment is more responsible and compatible 
with human rights, including the right to food. In the field of international 
investment law, efforts to incorporate greater human rights protections have 
focused on treaty negotiations and on investment arbitration.  These efforts 
seek to give states greater regulatory capacity to deal with issues, such as 
violations of the right to food, as they arise in connection with investments.  
These recent developments, though varying in their legal effect, reflect 
important international will to bring corporate actions, investment, and 
human rights into greater alignment. 
1. Developments in International Investment Law 
There has been some momentum in recent years to incorporate human 
rights considerations into international investment law.  While the bulk of 
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existing IIAs do not mention human rights, some newer IIAs are starting to 
incorporate human rights provisions.  However, these newer IIAs remain a 
distinct minority.  In addition, efforts are being made to raise human rights 
considerations in investor-state arbitration.  Likewise, this approach has not 
yet gained much traction; it is also a remedial solution as opposed to a 
forward-looking approach to guiding human rights-consistent investment.  
We now discuss each development in turn. 
It is extremely rare for an IIA to refer explicitly to human rights, let 
alone the right to food.  A 2014 Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) study of 2,107 investment treaties revealed that a 
mere 0.5 percent contained express reference to human rights.178  This was 
compared to just over 10 percent that referenced the environment and 5 
percent that mentioned labor conditions and standards.179  This lacuna is 
evident in the vast majority of country model BITs, most of which fail to 
explicitly reference human rights.180  Consistent with the OECD findings, 
the current 2012 US Model BIT mentions in the preamble the desire to 
“achieve these objectives in a manner consistent with the protection of 
health, safety, and the environment, and the promotion of internationally 
recognized labor rights,” without expressly referencing any other human 
rights that may be affected in the course of an investment, such as the right 
to food.181  The absence of human rights provisions in most existing treaties 
directly affects the scope of arbitration, since a tribunal’s jurisdiction is 
granted by the treaty, and a tribunal generally will only decide on disputes 
arising from alleged breaches of a treaty provision.182 
Questions of scope notwithstanding, there has been an increase in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178  Kathryn Gordon, Joachim Pohl & Marie Bouchard, Investors Rights and Human Rights 
– Interactions Under Investment Treaty, LSE - LABORATORY FOR ADVANCED RES. ON THE 




179  Id. 
180  See MARC JACOB, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 9 
(2010), http://www.humanrights-business.org/files/international_investment_agreements_ 
and_human_rights.pdf; C. Reiner & C. Schreuer, Human Rights and International Investment 
Arbitration, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 82 
(P.M. Dupuy, F. Francioni & E.U. Petersmann eds., 2009). 
181  2012 US MODEL BILATERAL TREATY, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf. 
182  Patrick Dumberry, When and How Allegations of Human Rights Violations Can Be 
Raised in Investor-State Arbitration, 13 J. WORLD INVEST. & TRADE 349, 359 (2012), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2082016. 
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interest recently regarding the incorporation of human rights considerations 
into investor-state dispute resolution.  A LSLBI’s human rights implications 
for non-parties may arise in arbitration in two ways: (1) as a defense for state 
action taken in furtherance of human rights obligations that breaches an IIA 
obligation owed to an investor, and (2) as an allegation that an investor has 
caused human rights abuses, potentially limiting their ability to claim IIA 
protections or even be held directly liable for such breaches.183 
The two main stakeholders who may raise the human rights impacts on 
non-parties in investment arbitration are states and affected communities (or 
their representatives, such as NGOs).184  While the former is involved in the 
arbitration as a respondent party, the latter is considered a “non-investor” 
and may only submit amicus curiae briefs, if permitted.185  Some treaties 
expressly permit submissions from non-disputing parties.  Aside from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183  See, e.g., UNCTAD, Selected Recent Developments in IIA: Arbitration and Human 
Rights: IIA MONITOR No. 2 (2009) International Investment Agreements, 
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Representative of the Secretary General), Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for 
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Objections to Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Counter-Memorial on the Merits, South 
American Silver Limited (Claimant) v. Plurinational State of Bolivia (Respondent), PCA 
Case No. 2013-15, ¶ 4 (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw4262_0.pdf (unofficial English translation). 
184  While investors have raised arguments claiming that they are owed human rights, such 
as the right to property, and tribunals have looked to human rights norms in interpreting 
international law, these situations are outside the scope of this Article; we focus on the human 
rights of people within host states. For more on how tribunals have considered human rights 
law, see PETERSON, supra note 97, at 7 (“In a number of instances, adjudicators of treaty 
disputes have invoked human rights law as a guide or an analogy when interpreting the legal 
protections owed to foreign investors.  For example, human rights norms related to due 
process or property rights are studied by adjudicators in order to help interpret and elucidate 
the investment treaty protections owed to foreign investors.”).  See also UNCTAD, supra note 
183, at 4. 
185  See Dumberry, supra note 182, at 370-71; J. Harrison, Human Rights Arguments in 
Amicus Curiae Submissions: Promoting Social Justice?, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 419 (P.M. Dupuy, F. Francioni & E.U. Petersmann eds., 
2009). 
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disputes arising under such treaties, this amicus option has gained limited 
traction with arbitral proceedings to date, with “non-investors” only rarely 
able to submit briefs.186  Even if permitted, tribunals retain discretion to 
decide whether to take such interventions into account.187 
Whether a tribunal will incorporate human rights considerations into its 
decision-making depends, first, on whether it is afforded jurisdiction by the 
IIA to decide on human rights issues, and, second, on whether it is able or 
willing to decide on such matters.188  The willingness of a tribunal to decide 
on human rights issues sometimes depends on the content of the treaty, 
which limits the subject matter over which they can rule.189  So far, the 
scope for considering human rights during the arbitration stage has been 
limited.  Arbitral panels are generally uninterested in addressing issues not 
explicitly included in the investment treaty or in finding specific conflicts 
between a state’s human rights and investment obligations. 
The European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR), 
in chronicling a panel’s rejection of an amicus brief, has questioned whether 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186  See, e.g., EUR. CTR. CONST. & HUM. RTS. (ECCHR), HUMAN RIGHTS INAPPLICABLE IN 




(chronicling the rejection by ICSID of an amicus submission by Chiefs of four indigenous 
communities in an area in Zimbabwe affected by a timber plantation operation). 
187  For example, under Rule 37(2) of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) Convention’s Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, a tribunal 
may permit a non-disputing party to file a written submission on a matter within the scope of 
the dispute.  ICSID, Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, in ICSID CONVENTION: 
REGULATIONS & RULES Rule 117 (Apr. 2006), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf.  In 
determining whether to allow the submission, the tribunal must consider the extent to which 
the submission would assist in determining a factual or legal issue, the extent to which it 
addresses a matter within the scope of the dispute, and the extent of the non-disputing party’s 
interest in the proceeding.  Id.; see also, e.g., Sarah Schadendorf, Human Rights Arguments in 
Amicus Curiae Submissions: Analysis of ICSID and NAFTA Investor-State Arbitrations, 10 
TRANSNAT’L DISPUTE MGMT. (Jan. 2013), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2206812 (questioning the extent to which 
amicus briefs are taken into account by tribunals). 
188  For an argument that there is scope for human rights considerations in investment 
arbitration, see Yannick Radi, Realizing Human Rights in Investment Treaty Arbitration: A 
Perspective from Within the International Investment Law Toolbox, 37 N.C. J. INT’L L. & 
COM. REG. 1107 (2012). 
189  Id. at 1112 (“Investment arbitration cannot rule over claims other than those related to 
investment law.”). 
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amicus submissions have ever had a determinative impact on the award 
rendered,190 or if they simply are permitted in order to lend public legitimacy 
to the proceedings.191  As the ECCHR noted after an International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) tribunal rejected an amicus 
submission by the Chiefs of four indigenous communities in an area of 
Zimbabwe affected by a timber plantation operation: 
Despite acknowledging that the proceedings may well impact upon 
the rights of the affected indigenous communities, in their decision 
the tribunal asserts that international human rights law has no 
relevance to the dispute. 
This decision demonstrates a failure of the current international 
investment arbitration system to ensure human rights compatibility 
of decisions.  It also highlights the deficit of human rights provisions 
in bilaterally-negotiated trade and investment treaties. . . .192 
When an amicus curiae brief is permitted, it may raise similar human 
rights arguments as those raised by the respondent state.  An example of an 
investor-state arbitration in which a human rights defense to state action was 
raised by both an amici curiae brief and the host state is the Suez et al. v. 
Argentina matter.193  The matter concerned the privatization of water 
services in Argentina and the expenses that private companies encountered 
as a result of measures taken by the government during the country’s 
financial crisis.194  Specifically, the state had prohibited the investors from 
increasing their water tariffs in order to mitigate increased operating costs 
that resulted from the measures.  Defending itself from claims that its 
measures had effectively pushed the investors’ operations into bankruptcy, 
Argentina argued that the measures were necessary for safeguarding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190  ECCHR, supra note 186, at 3. 
191  Id. 
192  Id. at 2. 
193  Decision on Liability, Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. 
(InterAguas) v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, ¶¶ 256, 262 (July 30, 2010), 
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/SuezInterAguaDecisiononLiability.pdf; see also Decision on 
Liability, Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. (Vivendi) v. Arg. Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19 (July 30, 2010), 
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/SuezVivendiAWGDecisiononLiability.pdf. 
194  The above fact scenario is based off the summary provided in both footnote 46 of 
Barnali Choudhury, Exception Provisions as a Gateway to Incorporating Human Rights 
Issues into International Investment Agreements, 49 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 670, n.46 
(2011), and in Luke Eric Peterson, Argentina Liable for Denying Fair and Equitable 
Treatment to Suez-Led Consortia of Foreign Investors in Buenos Aires and Santa Fe Water 
Concessions, INV. ARB. REP. (Aug. 5, 2010), http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20100818_9. 
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inhabitants’ right to water.  The state, as well as the amici curiae brief 
submitted by a group of NGOs, claimed that the human right to water 
trumped the investment obligations.195  In its 2010 decisions, the Tribunal 
did not resolve the question of investment versus human rights hierarchy.  
Instead, it stated that Argentina had to respect both types of obligations 
equally and could indeed have respected both.196  These arbitration 
proceedings demonstrate how unwilling tribunals are to find specific 
conflicts between a state’s human rights and investment obligations, thus 
limiting human rights defenses under the current legal regime.  As such, 
while the potential of such intervention remains, the success of amicus 
curiae submissions in raising human rights concerns at the arbitration level 
has so far been limited.197 
Mechanisms to remedy these arbitral limitations include providing 
jurisdiction to arbitral panels within treaties to consider human rights and 
granting standing to affected parties to join and participate in dispute 
proceedings in which they have an interest.  While these steps would be a 
welcome positive development, such mechanisms would be remedial by 
nature.  While they may have some deterrent effect in the context of LSLBI, 
they would not necessarily encourage more human rights-consistent 
investments.  Conversely, proposals have been made for how IIAs could be 
reworked to provide a more enabling framework for rights-consistent 
investments; a small number of newer IIAs have already integrated human 
rights in some way. 
IIAs can incorporate human rights considerations in various ways, 
including by referencing rights in the preamble to aid with treaty 
interpretation, by expressly providing that human rights treaties prevail in 
the event of a conflict with the IIA, or by clarifying that certain substantive 
provisions will not be breached if measures are taken in the interest of 
human rights.198  For example, the North American Free Trade Agreement 
includes a clause that allows host states to enact measures aimed at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 See JORGE E. VIÑUALES, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 180 (2012). 
196  See id. 
197  Harrison, supra note 185. 
198  Choudhury, supra note 194, at 714. In addition, some commentators even argue that 
BITs should impose human rights obligations on corporations. However, this approach has 
yet to take hold in practice. See, e.g., Patrick Dumberry & Gabrielle Dumas-Aubin, How to 
Impose Human Rights Obligations on Corporations Under Investment Treaties?, 2011-2012 
Y.B INT’L INV. L. & POL’Y (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2013), 569-600, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2404054. 
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protecting human rights to the extent they are consistent with the IIA.199  
Somewhat similarly, the Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic 
and Trade Agreement (CETA), a recently negotiated free trade agreement 
(FTA) between Canada and the European Union (EU) that is awaiting EU 
approval,200 incorporates human rights considerations in both the preamble 
and the investment chapter. The preamble recognizes the “importance of . . . 
human rights . . . for the development of international trade and economic 
cooperation” and reaffirms the parties’ “strong attachment” to the UDHR.201 
Article X.15 in the investment chapter provides for a very limited denial of 
benefits on grounds of the protection of human rights in the case of non-
party control of an investor.202 
An agreement can also impose obligations on states to assess the human 
rights impacts of the agreement.  This assessment could include the socio-
economic rights, such as the right to food, of communities whose 
subsistence farming and livelihoods will be affected by LSLBI.  The 
Canada-Colombia Free Trade Agreement is an interesting example of a free 
trade agreement with an investment chapter that imposes obligations on 
states to assess human rights impacts.203  An ancillary agreement to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199  Radi, supra note 188, at 1110-1 (citing art. 1114(1) of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) as an example). 
200  Countries and Regions: Canada, EUR. COMMISSION, 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/canada/ (last visited Jan. 20, 
2016). 
201  Comprehensive Economic and Trade Act (CETA), pmbl., Art. X, Can.-E.U., Aug. 5, 
2014, http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-
aecg/text-texte/toc-tdm.aspx?lang=eng. 
202  The text’s joint declaration notes, “With respect to Article X.15 (Denial of Benefits - 
Investment), Article Y (Denial of Benefits - CBTS) and Article XX (National Security 
Exception - Exceptions), the Parties confirm their understanding that measures that are 
‘related to the maintenance of international peace and security’ include the protection of 
human rights.”  Id. art. X. 
203  Chapter 8 of the Agreement is on investment.  Article 816 on Corporate Social 
Responsibility provides: 
Each Party should encourage enterprises operating within its territory or subject 
to its jurisdiction to voluntarily incorporate internationally recognized standards 
of corporate social responsibility in their internal policies, such as statements of 
principle that have been endorsed or are supported by the Parties.  These 
principles address issues such as labour, the environment, human rights, 
community relations and anti-corruption.  The Parties remind those enterprises 
of the importance of incorporating such corporate social responsibility standards 
in their internal policies. 
Canada-Columbia Free Trade Agreement, art. VIII, Can.-Colum., Nov. 21, 2008, 
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/colombia-
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Canada-Colombia FTA requires the two states to produce annual reports on 
the effect of the measures taken under the FTA on human rights in both 
territories.204  This requirement to produce country-level human rights 
impact assessments (HRIAs) holds interesting potential to assist 
governments and other stakeholders in better understanding the impacts of 
trade and FDI.  In the case of LSLBI, assessments of this nature could help 
reveal situations where communities have been removed from their land and 
whether or not alternative access to food has been provided following their 
removal.  This information could help state parties assess whether their trade 
and investment commitments conflict with their human rights obligations 
and, if so, whether any adjustments could be made to ensure that they do not 
violate their existing rights obligations.205  In addition, information from the 
assessments could theoretically be raised during dispute proceedings under 
the agreement, perhaps serving as a partial defense for a respondent state.206  
Although a promising effort to incorporate human rights issues at the treaty 
level, the assessments issued by Canada and Colombia to date have been of 
limited utility.  Nevertheless, future administrations, with more political will 
to use these assessments, could help develop them into a stronger and more 
robust tool. Alternatively, governments can require HRIAs of trade or 
investment agreements before such agreements are concluded.  Such ex ante 
assessments, however, can be difficult in practice because the future impacts 
of a draft agreement are not always clear.207  Still, they are important for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
colombie/can-colombia-toc-tdm-can-colombie.aspx?lang=eng. However, this language of 
“encourages” as opposed to obligatory language such as “must” or “shall” waters down the 
effect of the provision in not making it legally binding. 
204  Agreement Concerning Annual Reports on Human Rights and Free Trade Between 
Canada and the Republic of Colombia, art 1, Can.-Colum., May 27, 2010, http://www.treaty-
accord.gc.ca/text-texte.aspx?id=105278. 
205  For a discussion on HRIAs, see EITAN FELNER, NORDIC TRUST FUND & WORLD BANK, 
HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT ASSESSMENTS: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE, DIFFERENCES WITH 
OTHER FORMS OF ASSESSMENTS AND RELEVANCE FOR DEVELOPMENT (Feb. 2013), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PROJECTS/Resources/40940-
1331068268558/HRIA_Web.pdf. 
206  The former UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food argues, “Where an 
inconsistency between the human rights obligations of a State and its obligations under a trade 
or investment agreement becomes apparent only after the entry into force of the said 
agreement, the pre-existing human rights obligations must prevail.”  Olivier De Schutter 
(Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Addendum, Guiding Principles on Human Rights 
Impact Assessments of Trade and Investment Agreements, ¶ 1.3, A/HRC/19/59/Add.5 at 5 
(Dec. 19, 2011), 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session19/A-HRC-
19-59-Add5_en.pdf. 
207  See, e.g., CARIN SMALLER, HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT ASSESSMENTS FOR TRADE AND 
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alerting negotiating parties to the potential impacts of such agreements, 
thereby allowing them to revise their design accordingly to ensure that rights 
are adequately protected.208 
Finally, the Southern African Development Community model BIT 
(SADC Model BIT) shows how human rights can be incorporated into BITs 
in a substantive way.209  In addition to language in the Preamble recognizing 
the importance of furthering human rights, the SADC Model BIT includes 
minimum standards for human rights, environment, and labor in a section 
focused on the “Rights and Obligations of Investors and State Parties.”210  
Those minimum standards require investors to respect human rights and not 
to undertake investments that will breach human rights.211  Importantly, 
these are binding obligations.  The SADC Model BIT also requires 
environmental and social impact assessments that include “assessments of 
the impacts on the human rights of the persons in the areas potentially 
impacted by the investment, including the progressive realization of human 
rights in those areas.”212  This goes beyond the human rights assessment 
requirement imposed in the Canada-Colombia agreement, as it requires ex 
ante assessments at the investment-project level, rather than ex post country-
level reviews of the agreement as a whole.  In the case of LSLBI and the 
right to food, such assessments could help identify where an investment 
might negatively affect the right to food, such as through the removal of 
communities from their traditional land, particularly if an alternative means 
of access to food has not been demonstrated.  Identifying possible negative 
impacts before a project is undertaken could thus provide the opportunity to 
modify or halt the investment project to avoid such harms. 
While these new treaties and proposals have great potential to change 
IIAs moving forward, they do not answer the question of what to do with the 
more than 3000 existing IIAs that potentially constrain the protection of the 
right to food in the context of LSLBI. In this respect, states have three 
options available to them.  First, they can take steps to clarify their intentions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 6-8 (Ann Simpson ed., June 2010), 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/food/docs/report_hria-seminar_2010.pdf. 
208  See, e.g., Olivier De Schutter & Kaitlin Cordes, Trading Away Human Rights, PROJECT 
SYNDICATE (Jan. 7, 2014), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2013/10/Project_Syndicate_-
_Trading_Away_Human_Rights_-_Jan_7_2014.pdf. 
209  SOUTH AFRICAN DEV. COMMUNITY, SADC MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY 
TEMPLATE WITH COMMENTARY (July 2012), http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/sadc-model-bit-template-final.pdf. 
210  Id. part 3. 
211  Id. art. 15.1. 
212  Id. art. 13.2. 
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regarding texts of investment treaties.213  States can do this in several ways: 
by “issuing joint interpretations with their other treaty parties, exchanging 
diplomatic notes, making unilateral declarations, and submitting briefs as 
non-disputing parties or respondents.”214  States can also clarify 
jurisdictional, procedural, and substantive ambiguities in treaty texts,215 
thereby assisting any future investment arbitration with treaty interpretation. 
This, in turn, can potentially open up space for host governments to 
undertake the actions they believe are necessary to meet their human rights 
obligations while minimizing their concerns about potential liability under 
investment dispute proceedings.  Second, states can seek to negotiate 
amendments to existing treaties.  Pursuant to Article 30 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, this would occur by agreement between 
the parties in accordance with the Convention.216  Third, states can terminate 
existing IIAs and either renegotiate new treaties that are more rights-
consistent, or choose to not sign new IIAs.217  This latter option may be 
increasingly attractive, as there is growing doubt regarding whether BITs 
actually stimulate greater investment than would occur without an 
investment treaty.218  South Africa, for instance, is in the process of 
cancelling its BITs and replacing them instead with a comprehensive and 
rights-consistent investment law.219  This option requires states to have a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213  See LISE JOHNSON & MERIM RAZBAEVA, COLUM. CTR. SUSTAINABLE INV., STATE 
CONTROL OVER INVESTMENT TREATIES 2 (Apr. 2014), 
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/04/State-Control-over-Interpretation-of-Investment-
FINAL-8.13.14.pdf; Wolfgang Alschner et al., Interpretation of IIAs: What States Can Do 
(UNCTAD, IIA Issue Note No. 3, Dec. 2011), 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/webdiaeia2011d10_en.pdf. 
214  For more detail on context and timing, see JOHNSON & RAZBAEVA, supra note 213, at 2. 
215  Id. 
216  For a discussion on how to amend treaties, see James D. Fry & Odysseas G. Repousis, 
Intertemporality and International Investment Arbitration: Protecting the Jurisdiction of 
Established Tribunals, 31 ARB. INT’L 213, 217-19 (May 4, 2015). 
217  See id. at 219-23 for an explanation on the process of termination. 
218  See, e.g., Jason Webb Yackee, Bilateral Investment Treaties, Credible Commitment, 
and the Rule of (International) Law: Do BITs Promote Foreign Direct Investment?, 42 L. & 
SOC’Y REV. 805, 805-12 (2008); Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties 
Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT’L 
L. 397 (2011). 
219  See JOHNSON & RAZBAEVA, supra note 213, at 2; Jackwell Feris, Challenging the Status 
Quo – South Africa’s Termination of its Bilateral Trade Agreements, DLA PIPER INT’L ARB. 
NEWSL. (Dec. 10, 2014), 
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2014/12/international-arbitration-
newsletter-q4-2014/challenging-the-status-quo/; Adam Green, South Africa: BITS in Pieces, 
FIN. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2012), http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/10/19/south-africa-bits-in-
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strong domestic investment law, which is discussed further in Part III.B.1. 
The two distinct approaches to integrating human rights in international 
investment law, at the negotiations stage and during arbitration, are in some 
ways complementary.  Although incorporating human rights into treaties at 
the negotiations stage possesses some clear advantages, efforts to include 
human rights in investment treaties are inherently focused on future treaties.  
Inserting human rights considerations into investment arbitration, on the 
other hand, allows stakeholders to raise human rights concerns with respect 
to existing investment treaties and the disputes under them.  Currently, the 
scope for considering human rights during the arbitration stage is limited, 
and tribunals’ competence in addressing human rights law may be 
questionable.220 
Neither approach to incorporating human rights considerations into 
investment law will, on its own, lead to the realization of the right to food or 
of other human rights.  Nor would either approach necessarily resolve right-
to-food issues that result from LSLBI.  At best, these efforts would help 
create the space that governments need to meet their human rights 
obligations, while limiting the factors that might persuade them to instead 
favor the commitments they have made under investment treaties.  These 
efforts are thus important steps towards creating a more balanced and rights-
supportive international legal regime.  They should not, however, be viewed 
as solutions for fully realizing the right to food or other rights in the context 
of LSLBI. 
2. Developments in International Human Rights Law 
Significant multilateral effort has been directed at addressing the 
responsibilities and obligations of corporate actors to ensure greater 
corporate accountability for human rights abuses. These efforts cover 
corporate actors engaging in LSLBI.  The most prominent endeavor to date 
is the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
(Guiding Principles), endorsed by the Human Rights Council in June 
2011.221  The Guiding Principles are non-binding principles that set out how 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
pieces/. For an overview of the current public debate surrounding ISDS, see Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement: The Arbitration Game, supra note 103. 
220  See, e.g., PETERSON, supra note 97, at 8. 
221  U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTS., GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON 
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, HR/PUB/11/04 at iv (2011), 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf 
[hereinafter GPBHR] (“The Special Representative annexed the Guiding Principles to his 
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states and businesses should implement the UN ‘Protect, Respect and 
Remedy’ Framework in order to “better manage business and human rights 
challenges.”222  Under this Framework, governments have a duty to protect 
human rights, which includes protection from the actions of business 
enterprises.  Business enterprises, in turn, have a responsibility to respect 
human rights.  This responsibility requires not “causing or contributing to 
adverse human rights impacts through their own activities, and address[ing] 
such impacts when they occur.”223  This includes avoiding investments that 
cause individuals to lose their access to subsistence or livelihood farming 
without adequate compensation. Access may be lost due to their removal 
from the land or due to large-scale operations that negatively affect 
watercourses, which harms farmers’ ability to grow food crops.  In addition, 
both governments and business enterprises must ensure adequate access to 
remedies for those whose rights have been harmed by corporate activity.224  
In the case of LSLBI, this might include project-level grievance mechanisms 
that can provide redress for negative impacts on the right to food or other 
human rights. 
The Guiding Principles have been criticized by some commentators for 
their lack of binding force225 and for not creating adequate corporate 
accountability for human rights abuses.226  The international human rights 
community is currently debating whether to develop a binding treaty on 
transnational corporations and human rights.227  In June 2014, the Human 
Rights Council issued a resolution establishing an intergovernmental 
working group to explore and develop such a treaty.228  This is a promising 
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development, although the current opposition of key home states for 
corporate investors, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, may 
be a difficult challenge to overcome.  Even if the treaty proceeds, however, it 
remains to be seen whether it will make sufficient provision for socio-
economic rights, such as the right to food. 
Another area of development relates to the pursuit of new avenues for 
redress.  This was prompted in part by a 2013 United States Supreme Court 
decision that severely limited the use of a domestic law to pursue corporate 
accountability.  Prior to that decision, the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) had been 
growing in prevalence as a mechanism in the United States by which non-
U.S. citizens could seek relief for certain human rights abuses committed 
abroad by corporate actors.229  In 2013, however, the Supreme Court 
narrowed the law’s scope in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum,230 finding 
that the ATS presumptively does not apply extraterritorially.231  In response 
to Kiobel, a Working Group was established to develop the idea of an 
International Arbitration Tribunal on Business and Human Rights to provide 
a new forum for human rights abuse victims to seek access to justice.232  As 
currently conceptualized, the Tribunal would handle human rights disputes 
and offer both mediation and arbitration.233  Its proceedings would ideally be 
faster than traditional litigation and could be held around the world.234  
Arbitration awards made by the Tribunal would be enforceable under the 
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1958 New York Convention.235  If established, such a tribunal may help 
level the imbalance in protections afforded under the human rights and 
investment regimes, but the tribunal is still in the very early stages of 
conceptualization.236  As such, its current utility to a person who has lost 
access to food due to a LSLBI is nil. 
Aside from these general international efforts to increase corporate 
accountability and improve redress mechanisms, there have also been 
specific international actions seeking to improve agricultural investment.  
These actions have been driven by a range of actors and processes with 
diverse agendas.  A first group of efforts includes guidelines and principles 
developed by the international community, involving either multilateral or 
multi-stakeholder negotiations.  The most recent and relevant is the 
Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems,237 
approved by the Committee on World Food Security (CFS) in October 
2014.238  This voluntary, non-binding instrument provides ten overarching 
principles regarding responsible agricultural investment and elucidates the 
roles and responsibilities of various stakeholders.  The Principles set out a 
framework for stakeholders in “developing national policies, programmes, 
regulatory frameworks, corporate social responsibility programmes, 
individual agreements and contracts.”239 
The depth of the Principles’ human rights commitments is debatable.  
Because the Principles were developed after lengthy multi-stakeholder 
negotiations, they are the product of compromise.  How the Principles would 
address human rights was a central point of tension between civil society 
groups, private sector representatives, and governments.240  At first glance, 
their treatment of human rights appears sufficient.  Human rights are 
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mentioned multiple times in the Principles, including Principle 1, which 
states, “responsible investment in agriculture and food systems supports 
states’ obligations regarding the progressive realization of the right to 
adequate food in the context of national food security, and all intended users’ 
responsibility to respect human rights.”241  In addition, the Principles 
specifically assert that states “should maintain adequate domestic policy 
space to meet their human rights obligations . . . [including] through 
investment treaties or contracts”242 and note that business enterprises must 
“act with due diligence to avoid infringing on human rights.”243  However, 
one civil society organization involved in the negotiations has argued that 
the Principles are problematic from a human rights perspective for several 
reasons, including their attempt to balance human rights with, or subordinate 
them to, the international trade regime and their relatively weak language on 
the regulatory role of the state.244  Other civil society organizations have 
raised concerns about the Principles’ treatment of free, prior and informed 
consent, and their failure to condemn “land grabbing.”245  From a right-to-
food perspective, the Principles could have gone deeper, drawing more 
explicit links between human rights norms and the types and parameters of 
investments that would promote them. 
Another significant instrument is the Voluntary Guidelines on the 
Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the 
Context of National Food Security (VGGT), which were also endorsed by 
the CFS in May 2012.  The VGGT aim to “promote secure tenure rights and 
equitable access to land, fisheries and forests as a means of eradicating 
hunger and poverty, supporting sustainable development and enhancing the 
environment.”246  Section 12 of the VGGT focuses on investments.247  
Among other points, the VGGT note, “responsible investments should do no 
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harm, safeguard against dispossession of legitimate tenure right holders and 
environmental damage, and should respect human rights.”248  The widely 
embraced VGGT arguably constitute soft law.249  As such, they provide 
important guidance for understanding how governments can meet their 
international legal obligations in relation to LSLBI.  A number of countries 
and other stakeholders are now attempting to ascertain how to operationalize 
the guidelines. 
A second group of efforts stems directly from the human rights 
community.  For example, in 2009 the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to 
food released “Large-scale land acquisitions and leases: A set of core 
principles and measures to address the human rights challenge.” This 
document included 11 core principles and measures for host States and 
investors, applying existing human rights law and obligations to the issue of 
large-scale land transactions.250  These principles demonstrate how 
international human rights law should be used to guide investment so that it 
contributes to the realization of the right to food.  For example, Principle 1 
urges a host state to weigh a proposed investment against other land uses 
that “could be better conducive of the long-term needs of the local 
population concerned and with the full realization of their human rights.”  
Following the guidance of these principles is an important step that host 
states can take towards satisfying their human rights obligations while 
remaining open to investment opportunities. 
Another set of efforts to guide more responsible agricultural investment, 
including LSLBI, arises from actors not explicitly focused on human rights.  
One early example from 2010 is the Principles for Responsible Agricultural 
Investment that Respects Rights, Livelihoods and Resources (PRAI), a 
document developed collaboratively by the World Bank, the FAO, the 
International Fund for Agricultural Development, and the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development.  The PRAI are voluntary, and aim to 
encourage corporate social responsibility in respect to LSLBI.251  They only 
mention human rights in one paragraph and neglect the right to food entirely.  
This lack of emphasis on human rights, combined with the perception that 
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the PRAI were developed without sufficient multi-stakeholder collaboration, 
was one impetus for the subsequent development of the Principles for 
Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems, discussed above.  
In recent years, the PRAI have been joined by a multitude of other 
guidelines, principles, and guidance documents.  Some of the newest efforts 
include a guidance document developed jointly by the FAO and the OECD 
on responsible business conduct along agricultural supply chains and 
guidelines issued by the U.S. Agency for International Development on 
responsible land-based investment.  Although intended to illuminate best 
practices, one frequent critique of these combined efforts is that the rapid 
proliferation of such documents has simply rendered it more difficult for 
companies and governments to assess the agricultural investments with 
which they are involved.252 
The high level of activity at the international level shows a wide 
recognition of the need to address gaps in corporate accountability, as well 
as the desire to ensure better outcomes from agricultural investments.  
Although most of these developments are too nascent to judge, some of them 
hold significant potential to positively affect the realization of the right to 
food in the context of LSLBI or to provide greater avenues of redress for 
those whose rights were violated by such investments. 
The substantial developments in both the international investment and 
international human rights legal regimes discussed in this section hold 
promise in helping to increase corporate accountability and to re-balance 
investment and human rights protections.  In the future, such developments 
could provide new avenues of redress for those whose right to food was 
violated in the context of LSLBI.  While providing recourse for human 
rights abuses and defenses for state action in the interest of human rights is 
important, the effects of amending remedial mechanisms are limited insofar 
as they only address problems once they have arisen.  Although these 
changes could potentially create greater incentives for governments and 
investors to ensure that LSLBI do not violate the right to food in the first 
place, whether such results would occur is unclear. 
Finally, most of these changes are neither imminent nor guaranteed.  
Given the current limitations with the international human rights and 
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investment regimes, we now turn to consider other ways of addressing 
human rights abuses related to LSLBI.  In particular, we examine host and 
home state measures to prevent such abuses before they arise. 
III.   PREVENTING RIGHT-TO-FOOD ABUSES IN AGRICULTURAL 
INVESTMENT: HOST AND HOME STATE OBLIGATIONS AND MEASURES 
While the international investment and human rights developments 
outlined above show promise for the future protection of human rights in the 
context of LSLBI, the question remains of what actions can be taken now.  
In Part III, we suggest options for both host and home states.  As noted 
above, governments bear the primary duty of respecting human rights. In the 
context of international investment, this means that host states, as recipients 
of investment, must protect and respect rights that may be affected by 
investment activity.  In addition, home states arguably have extraterritorial 
obligations to protect rights from the impacts of outward investment in 
certain situations.  Pursuant to these obligations, both host and home states 
should seek to prevent LSLBI from negatively affecting human rights, 
including the right to food.  Host states can preemptively improve LSLBI to 
avoid and mitigate human rights abuses in two main ways: strengthening 
domestic laws and ensuring rights protections in land investment contracts.  
As noted above, they can also bolster these reforms by issuing 
interpretations, re-negotiating, or terminating IIAs to address the limitations 
of existing IIAs with respect to human rights.  Measures that home states can 
undertake include conditioning support to outward investors engaging in 
LSLBI, establishing various disclosure requirements, and otherwise 
regulating investments in an effort to influence better outcomes. 
A.  Host and Home State Human Rights Obligations Related to the Right to 
Food 
The vast majority of states have right-to-food obligations.  The 
ICESCR, the main, legally binding instrument that codifies the right to food, 
has been ratified by 164 countries, with no reservations to Article 11 (the 
right to food).253  Countries that have signed but not ratified the ICESCR, 
such as the United States, do not have the same legal obligations under the 
treaty, but they should not take steps to undermine the rights codified 
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within.254  And many of the 40-odd countries that have not signed or ratified 
the ICESCR have ratified at least one of the other treaties that protect aspects 
of the right to food.255  Moreover, to the extent that the right to food 
constitutes customary international law, it creates obligations for all states, 
regardless of which treaties they have signed.256  As discussed in Part I.A.2, 
government obligations regarding the right to food extend beyond 
progressive realization.  In addition to progressively realizing the right, 
governments must respect and protect the right to food by not interfering 
with existing access to food and by preventing third parties from interfering 
with such access. 
The right to food—and human rights generally—has traditionally been 
discussed with respect to government obligations towards people within 
their territories or under their jurisdiction.  Yet in some situations, 
governments’ human rights obligations may extend extraterritorially.  
Multiple legally binding instruments either imply or have been interpreted to 
include an extraterritorial component. This includes the ICESCR.257  
Moreover, legal scholars have increasingly asserted that such extraterritorial 
application means that in certain cases governments must respect, protect, 
and fulfill human rights obligations beyond their own borders.  This was 
most explicitly articulated in the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial 
Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(Maastricht Principles), which were adopted by a group of international law 
experts in 2011.258  According to the Maastricht Principles, which seek to 
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illuminate existing international human rights law, the extraterritorial human 
rights obligations of governments exist in three situations: first, when a 
government exercises authority or effective control; second, when the 
government’s acts or omissions cause foreseeable effects on the enjoyment 
of rights outside its territory; and third, when the government is capable of 
taking measures through its executive, legislative, or judicial branches to 
realize rights in other territories, in accordance with international law.259 
These extraterritorial dimensions apply to all three types of 
governments’ human rights obligations: respecting, protecting, and fulfilling 
human rights.  Thus, for example, to protect the right to food 
extraterritorially, governments must undertake measures to ensure that third 
parties regulated or influenced by the governments do not interfere with the 
realization of this right in other territories.260  With respect to corporate 
activity, the Principles note that this duty exists when a “corporation, or its 
parent or controlling company, has its centre of activity, is registered or 
domiciled, or has its main place of business or substantial business activities, 
in the State concerned.”261 
In the context of LSLBI, host and home states with right-to-food 
obligations must not take any action that violates the right to food and must 
work to prevent third parties from doing so.  At a minimum, host states 
should not enter into land investment contracts without ensuring that these 
agreements will not result in right-to-food abuses.  Home states, meanwhile, 
should take steps to ensure that their outward investors engaging in LSLBI 
do not negatively affect the right to food.  Both host and home states have a 
number of options at their disposal to help prevent negative impacts from 
LSLBI. 
B.  Host State Measures 
Host states have an important role to play in pursuing solutions that 
prevent right-to-food and other human rights abuses from occurring as a 
result of LSLBI.  In addition to reviewing their position in relation to IIAs, 
host states can take action to protect human rights from the impacts of 
LSLBI by improving domestic laws and policies, as well as when 
negotiating land investment contracts.  None of these options, however, will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
STATES IN THE AREA OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS (Sept. 2011), 
http://www.etoconsortium.org/nc/en/main-navigation/library/maastricht-
principles/?tx_drblob_pi1%5BdownloadUid%5D=23 [hereinafter Maastricht Principles]. 
259  Id. ¶ 9(c). 
260  Id. ¶¶ 19-27. 
261  Id. ¶ 25(c). 
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suffice independently.  As such, host governments should simultaneously 
develop each of the three areas to afford greater human rights protections in 
the context of LSLBI. 
1. Domestic Laws and Policies 
The domestic law of host states is the primary source of law used to 
regulate agricultural investments.262  Strengthening the domestic legal 
regime in an effort to shape investment has distinct advantages over other 
approaches.  Governments can more easily develop robust domestic laws 
than they can negotiate a good IIA or investment contract, given that treaty 
and contract negotiations always require compromise.  Investor obligations 
related to compliance with human rights or environmental standards are 
therefore more easily imposed by incorporating the obligations into domestic 
law, rather than attempting to insert them into a negotiated agreement.  
Domestic laws, as opposed to individually negotiated contracts, also help to 
ensure that all investors have the same obligations.  This, in turn, can assure 
a sufficient minimum standard of operations, while also facilitating 
monitoring and enforcement.  In addition, imposing investor obligations 
through domestic laws rather than contracts renders those obligations more 
transparent, as domestic laws are usually accessible to the general public, 
while contracts are often undisclosed to non-contracting parties. 
To the extent possible, host governments seeking to strengthen their 
domestic investment setting in favor of human rights should address FDI in 
land and agriculture holistically in their domestic laws or policies.  For 
example, host states can start by identifying desired types of agricultural 
investment.  This would include a number of factors.  First, states should 
consider the implications of the underlying structures of agricultural 
investment, such as land-based investment versus investment that does not 
require land transfer.  Second, states could explore the most appropriate 
types of crops for investment.  Given that labor intensity differs dramatically 
among crops, a state’s choice of crops will affect its ability to realize the 
right to food.  Third, states should consider other types of relevant 
investment that may be beneficial from a right-to-food perspective.  For 
example, states should consider investments in agricultural infrastructure 
that could have beneficial spillover effects for small farmers and could lead 
to general improvements in food availability.  Host states could then ensure 
that investment laws and policies, including any incentives to attract 
investment, promote these types of desired investments and are aligned with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
262  SMALLER & MANN, supra note 13434, at 9. 
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national food strategies or right-to-food framework laws.  Any laws or 
policies that allow LSLBI must also incorporate sufficient safeguards to 
protect the rights of all legitimate tenure rights holders, including accessible 
procedures for raising tenure claims. 
Host governments that continue to accept LSLBI can seek to improve 
the processes by which such investments are undertaken and monitored.  For 
example, governments can assess their land contract negotiation processes, 
including how negotiations occur and who is consulted before and during 
negotiations.  After concluding any land investment contracts, host states 
could disclose such contracts and other relevant documents to make the 
underlying deals more transparent.  Such transparency is extremely rare, 
with very few governments providing these contracts to the public.263  Yet 
public disclosure of contracts helps citizens and other stakeholders assess the 
implications of deals and enables them to assist in monitoring the 
implementation of the deals to ensure that they do not violate human rights.  
Although implementing these various measures may be difficult for under-
resourced governments, framework laws and policies that define key 
agricultural investment objectives and incorporate some of the 
abovementioned options can help states attract and benefit from more rights-
supportive investments.  States can seek to align such laws and policies with 
the guidance on responsible agricultural investment discussed above in the 
designing stage. 
Host states can also establish a clear and sufficiently detailed framework 
policy for human rights impact assessments (HRIA).  This should not be too 
difficult for most host states, many of which already require environmental 
impact assessments (EIAs) before certain investments are approved or 
licenses granted. HRIAs are similar to EIAs and social impact assessments 
(SIAs), yet are grounded in human rights norms and designed to assess a 
project’s actual or potential impacts on human rights.264  While HRIAs can 
be initiated by companies, communities, or government entities, a host state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
263  At the time of writing, only two countries have disclosed at least most of their 
agricultural investment contracts: Liberia and Ethiopia. In addition, Sierra Leone has 
committed to disclosing 70 percent of its agricultural contracts, but has not yet done so. 
264  HRIAs have different objectives depending on which type of stakeholder is undertaking 
them. For companies, the purpose is to simplify company human rights management by 
providing companies with a “consistent, efficient, and systematic way to identify, prioritize, 
and address human rights risks and opportunities at a corporate, country, site, or product 
level.” FARIS NATOUR & JESSICA DAVIS PLUESS, BUSINESS FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (BSR), 
CONDUCTING AN EFFECTIVE HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT ASSESSMENT: GUIDELINES, STEPS, AND 
EXAMPLES 5 (Mar. 2013), 
http://www.bsr.org/reports/BSR_Human_Rights_Impact_Assessments.pdf. 
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requirement to undertake an HRIA tied to an investment should place the 
burden on the investor.  Approval of the investment could be made 
contingent on undertaking the HRIA, as well as on an investor’s ability to 
redesign a project to address any potential negative impacts that are 
uncovered. Investors unable to adequately address such impacts would not 
be allowed to proceed. 
Of course, whether a host state is able to adequately evaluate and act on 
company-submitted HRIAs is also a question of resources and capacity.  As 
the UN Guiding Principles recommend in respect of EIAs and SIAs, if such 
provisions are included, the state “must ensure that it has the capacity to 
effectively review, evaluate and to take appropriate and timely action on 
these assessments.”265  The Guiding Principles further advise that where the 
state lacks such capacity, “the contract should provide for alternatives, at 
least on a temporary basis, such as self-reporting or other external credible 
verification.”266  External verification could benefit a host state by assuring 
that projects meet a minimum standard of environmental and social impacts.  
This, in turn, could serve as a useful starting point until greater capacity is 
available to assess specific HRIAs. 
Addressing LSLBI in a holistic manner means striving to improve all 
laws that are relevant to such investment.  These may include human rights, 
tax, environmental, and investment laws, among others.267  When a state is 
already a party to IIAs, investment laws in particular should be carefully 
drafted so as to not provide even greater investor protections than what is 
already provided for under investment treaties.268  Strengthening domestic 
laws is, however, a long-term and complicated effort for host states.  Even 
more difficult than writing good law is undertaking institutional reform to 
ensure adequate monitoring and enforcement capacity. Although the ability 
to undertake such reform depends on the context and relevant capacity, 
governments and their donor partners can still prioritize efforts to do so.  To 
the extent that gaps remain in the short-term, good contracts can help, as 
discussed below.  However, contracts are not a panacea, and likewise require 
monitoring and enforcement. 
Finally, host states can ensure that appropriate redress mechanisms are 
available to individuals whose right to food has been violated in pursuit of 
LSLBI.  Although this is more of a remedial measure than a preemptive one, 
enabling remedies is important for minimizing the potential negative impacts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265  Ruggie, supra note 128, ¶ 30. 
266  Id. 
267  See SMALLER & MANN, supra note 134, at 9. 
268  For an example currently being proposed in Myanmar, see Part II.B.2 above. 
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of such investments.  Redress mechanisms, both judicial and non-judicial, 
can be provided by the state.  In addition, the state can also require investors 
to establish grievance mechanisms at the project level.269  Such a 
requirement could be incorporated in domestic law or in contracts.270  
Project-level grievance mechanisms allow complaints to be brought by both 
community members and project employees.  Redress mechanisms provided 
by the investor or the state are particularly important for individuals who 
have been harmed, given the lack of similar opportunities at the international 
level.271 
Domestic law is arguably the most important vehicle through which 
host states can seek to protect human rights, including in the context of 
LSLBI.  However, gaps in the legal regime can be addressed by the terms of 
investment contracts.  As such, it is relevant to next consider which actions 
host states can take in negotiating land contracts to ensure greater human 
rights protections. 
2. Investment Contracts 
The terms of investment contracts can be exceedingly important when 
they are used to fill gaps in domestic law.  They are therefore particularly 
significant where the domestic law in the host state is weak.272  Contracts 
determine a number of rights and obligations of investors, as well as of the 
host government.  In some cases, they also can help influence the outcomes 
of arbitral proceedings.  LSLBI contracts are commonly negotiated between 
host states and investors over state-owned land.  This means that, when the 
state negotiates land contracts, there are a number of measures it can take to 
provide greater human rights protections to individuals potentially affected 
by the investment. 
Certain contractual terms can be included in investment contracts to 
ensure better right-to-food protections.  For example, host states should 
ensure that water allocation is carefully addressed in contracts if it is not 
covered by a more comprehensive domestic law.  The right to water and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
269   See GPBHR, supra note 221, ¶ 29 and accompanying commentary. 
270  See, e.g., Grievance Mechanisms, NEGOTIATIONS PORTAL FOR HOST COUNTRY 
GOVERNMENTS, http://negotiationsupport.org/roadmap/grievance-mechanisms-0 (last visited 
Jan. 20, 2016). 
271  In some situations, there is the slight possibility that an investment agreement and 
arbitration under it can undermine state redress mechanisms. For example, Chevron initiated 
arbitration against Ecuador after plaintiffs from a community harmed by Chevron’s 
predecessor’s operations won a massive judgment in Ecuadorian courts. 
272  Mann, supra note 19, at 136. 
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right to food are closely interrelated human rights.273  Water is a productive 
resource that is necessary for people who grow their own food, as well as for 
people who undertake farming as a livelihood source.  Through these means, 
water access can affect both the first and third channels of food accessibility.  
In this context, it is important that an investment contract recognizes the 
rights of other users and enables equitable water access between the 
investor’s operations and the local community needs.  This may include a 
contractual provision that prohibits interference with the existing water 
rights of users when the LSLBI commences or, alternatively, a provision that 
facilitates appropriate changes in water use and allocation during the life of 
the contract.274 
Host states can also better fulfill their right-to-food obligations by using 
the contract to encourage local content and employment. Increased 
employment opportunities, either directly or indirectly, can support 
individuals in realizing their right to food through the first channel of 
earning incomes from employment or self-employment.275  Governments 
negotiating contracts can seek to establish certain goals or requirements for 
locally sourcing services and supplies, as well as encouraging local labor at 
all skill levels and training for nationals to take up higher managerial 
positions.276 
In addition to provisions that could be included in contracts, there are 
also provisions that host states should avoid when negotiating investment 
contracts.  For example, host states should avoid the use of stabilization 
clauses, which can restrict the applicability of legal reforms.277  To the 
extent that stabilization clauses are included, they should explicitly carve out 
human rights legislation exceptions, as well as other social, environmental, 
and public policy legislation exceptions.  This would ensure that states are 
able to undertake legislative or policy reforms to fulfill human rights that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
273  See, e.g., SURABHI CHOPRA, INST. BUS. & HUM. RTS., THE RIGHT TO FOOD AND WATER: 
DEPENDENCIES AND DILEMMAS 11 (2011), 
http://www.ihrb.org/pdf/Right_to_Food_and_Water_Dependencies_and_Dilemmas.pdf. 
274  Mann, supra note 19, at 138. 
275  Id. at 139. 
276  WTO national treatment obligations create some prohibitions on local content 
requirements, but these prohibitions do not currently apply to the least developed countries.  
Countries subject to such prohibitions can still encourage local content, however, and can 
require investors to not discriminate against local suppliers.  They may also be able to require 
investors to favor local suppliers so long as their prices and quality are comparable to that of 
other suppliers. 
277  Stabilization clauses are discussed in greater detail in Part II.A.3 above. See Mann, 
supra note 19, at 136. 
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would apply to the underlying investment.  Another provision that should be 
avoided is a requirement that all food products produced through the LSLBI 
be exported to the home state.  Such a requirement could be particularly 
problematic for host states in times of high global commodity prices, 
subjecting the state to expensive imports while simultaneously exporting 
food products.  Although it is unclear how frequently contracts actually 
include such clauses, host states should avoid them if suggested.278  
Avoiding these types of provisions will enhance host states’ ability to fulfill 
their right-to-food obligations in the context of LSLBI. 
As noted above, host governments may encounter difficulties in their 
ability to negotiate satisfactory contracts that address all of their concerns.  
At the negotiating table, host governments are often out-lawyered and under-
resourced, compared to their negotiating partner.  In addition, governments 
do not always possess the capacity to fully monitor and enforce contractual 
investor obligations.  Thus, host governments should not focus all of their 
efforts on negotiating strong contractual terms.  Investment contracts can 
serve an important purpose, however, and are one tool that host states can 
employ to ensure that LSLBI respect the right to food. 
As the previous discussion illustrates, host states can pursue a number 
of measures that would enable them to both demand higher rights standards 
from their corporate investors, and to defend their ability to respect, protect 
and fulfill human rights.  In addition to these host state measures, home 
states can also employ measures to regulate outward investors so that their 
investments are more rights-consistent.  These mechanisms are discussed in 
the next section. 
C. Home State Measures 
Home states can undertake a range of measures to encourage more 
rights-supportive outward investment.  For home states with right-to-food 
obligations, such efforts may be required under their extraterritorial 
obligations, as discussed above.  Even setting aside questions of obligations, 
home countries have good reasons to encourage more rights-supportive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
278  The authors have not seen any contracts that include this type of provision, but some 
commentators have asserted that some contracts do include such clauses.  See id. at 136-37. 
Such clauses may have held increased interest for investors in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 
food price crisis; they may be of less interest today.  In another approach to the problem, the 
former UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food has argued that contracts should require 
local sales of a minimum percentage of crops produced under LSLBI, with the percentage of 
local sales increasing if global commodity prices reach certain levels.  See De Schutter, supra 
note 250. The authors also have not seen any contracts with this provision. 
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outward investment, such as upholding their commitments under the 
Sustainable Development Goals.279  States have also shown their willingness 
to enact laws with extraterritorial reach.280  Options available to home states 
include ensuring that their policies do not inadvertently promote LSLBI with 
negative impacts, conditioning support to outward investors engaging in 
LSLBI, and establishing various disclosure requirements for outward 
investment.  As with host state measures, no single home state effort will 
fully resolve the negative effects of problematic outward investment.  Home 
states should thus seek to develop comprehensive strategies, combining 
multiple approaches to address the potentially negative rights impacts of 
outward land investment. 
1. Assessing Home State Domestic Policies 
Home state policies may inadvertently encourage outward investment in 
LSLBI that negatively affects human rights.  One basic measure that home 
states can take is to assess their domestic policies for potential implications 
in relation to LSLBI abroad, and to take steps to remediate any policies that 
might pose problems. Such policies might include, for example, incentives 
to promote production of biofuels. 
Government policies encouraging biofuel consumption have allegedly 
led to greater outward investment from European countries into less 
developed countries to establish agrofuel plantations.  In some cases, this 
investment can have negative rights impacts, in particular by displacing 
smallholder farmers from the land and productive resources on which they 
rely.281  In its concluding observations addressed to Belgium in 2013, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
279  The Sustainable Development Goals were adopted by the UN Member States in 
September 2015. As the Preamble notes, the goals “seek to realize the human rights of all.” 
Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, SUSTAINABLE 
DEV., https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld (last visited Jan. 
20, 2016). 
280  For examples of home country measures to regulate overseas activities, see COLUM. 
CTR. SUSTAINABLE INV. & HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS, HOME COUNTRY MEASURES (HCM) 
TAXONOMY (Nov. 7, 2014), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/01/CCSI-Taxonomy-_-Nov-
10.pdf. Prominent capital-exporting countries are a diverse group, and some may be more 
inclined than others to undertake initiatives that promote rights-supportive outward 
investment.  While the question of how to incentivize disparate types of home countries to 
implement such measures is outside the scope of this Article, it is worth mentioning that even 
countries that are not traditionally viewed as concerned with these issues have taken some 
steps to shape their outward investors’ actions to have more positive impacts.  For example, 
the Chinese government has issued some relevant CSR guidelines for publicly listed 
companies and state-owned enterprises. 
281  DEMBA DIOP ET AL., EU’S FRAMEWORK CONTRACT COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT: 
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UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights focused on the 
government’s promotion of agrofuels, noting that it was “likely to encourage 
large-scale cultivation of these products in third countries where Belgian 
firms operate and could lead to negative consequences for local farmers.”282  
The Committee recommended that the government undertake human rights 
impact assessments to ensure that Belgian companies working on agrofuel 
projects do not negatively affect the rights of local communities in the 
countries in which they operate.283 
Several options exist for home states that realize that certain state 
policies may encourage LSLBI that negatively affects the right to food.  If 
the risks are deemed too high, they can consider rescinding such policies 
altogether.  Alternatively, homes states can attempt to modify such policies 
to alleviate the risks.  For example, in February 2015, the European 
Parliament’s Environment Committee backed a draft law that would cap the 
amount of traditional biofuels made from food crops by 2020.284  This 
modification of existing policy could help mitigate the policy’s negative 
right-to-food impacts; as the current UN Special Rapporteur on the right to 
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conventional biofuel production has an impact on access to natural resources, such as land 
and water and often leads to an increase in land concentration to the detriment of smallholder 
farming practices.”); see also, e.g., Lorenzo Cotula, ‘Land Grabbing’ in Africa: Biofuels Are 
Not Off the Hook, INT’L INST. FOR ENVTL AND DEV. (Oct. 16, 2013), http://www.iied.org/land-
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282  Concluding Observations Concerning the Fourth Periodic Report of Belgium, supra 
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284  See EU Parliament Committee Backs New Limit on Food-Based Biofuels, INT’L CTR. 
TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-
news/biores/news/eu-parliament-committee-backs-new-limit-on-food-based-biofuels; Barbara 
Lewis, EU Lawmakers Back New Limit for Food-Based Biofuel, REUTERS (Feb. 24, 2015), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/24/us-eu-biofuels-idUSKBN0LS2D620150224. See 
also DIDIER BOURGUIGNON, EUR. PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH SERV., EU BIOFUELS POLICY: 
DEALING WITH INDIRECT LAND USE CHANGE (Feb. 2015), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/548993/EPRS_BRI(2015)548993
_REV1_EN.pdf; Ecaterina Casinge, Lawmakers Agree to Limit Food-Based Biofuels, 
EURACTIV.COM (last updated Apr. 16, 2015), http://www.euractiv.com/sections/sustainable-
dev/meps-agree-limit-food-based-biofuels-313760. 
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food, Hilal Elver, has observed, “it is clear that European biofuels policy as 
it stands is undermining global attempts to ensure that the world’s poorest 
families can feed themselves, as well as to fight climate change.”285  
Another option for home states is to introduce safeguards for problematic 
policies, such as requiring outward investors to undertake and disclose 
human rights impacts assessments when making investments incentivized by 
a state policy.  This requirement could be imposed as a broader disclosure 
requirement, as discussed below, or could be required if outward investors 
seek to benefit from home state incentives tied to the policy under review.  
Disclosing the results of HRIAs could encourage investors to ensure more 
rights-consistent practices, while incentives made conditional on an HRIA 
could be denied when an assessment demonstrates that an investment would 
have a negative impact on the right to food. 
2. Conditioning Support to Outward Investors 
In addition to incentives tied to specific policies, home states frequently 
provide more general investment support to outward investors.  They 
provide information to investors; offer financial measures, such as loans and 
insurance, or fiscal measures, such as tax exemptions; give diplomatic 
support; and secure protections through treaties.286  Through these measures, 
home states often seek to advance outward investment that has domestic 
benefits, such as increased employment or tax revenue.287  Home states that 
wish to encourage more rights-supportive outward investment can condition 
their investment support on positive impacts in the host country.288  Home 
states concerned about the rights impacts of LSLBI could thus make any 
support for such investment contingent on the investor meeting certain 
human rights-related standards.289 
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country measures, see Lise Johnson, Absent from the Discussion: The Other Half of 
Investment Promotion, (VALE COLUM. CTR. SUSTAINABLE INT’L INV., Columbia FDI 
Perspectives No. 79, Sept. 24, 2012), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/01/FDI_79.pdf. 
287  Johnson, Thomashausen & Cordes, supra note 229, at 3. 
288  Id. 
289   Whether specific rules should be tailored for specific investment destinations (for 
example, to address particularly fraught operating environments where human rights 
violations are common) is outside the scope of this Article.  However, if rules are designed 
based on international human rights instruments, or simply require compliance with certain 
relevant principles or guidelines, they would be aligned with agreed-upon standards and 
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Conditioning support to outward investors is not a new concept, and 
countries have taken various approaches in this regard.  For example, the 
United States’ development finance institution, the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation, awards financing for outward investment but 
conditions such support on satisfactory environmental and social standards, 
which includes the “human rights dimensions of sustainable 
development.”290  Similarly, the government of the Netherlands provides 
financing to outward investors who invest in emerging markets, but requires 
that such investors comply with the OECD’s Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises (OECD Guidelines), which outline responsible business 
practice.291 
Conditions can also be placed on support for outward investment in 
certain sectors.  For example, in mid-2014, Canada announced a new 
outward investor corporate social responsibility (CSR) policy in the 
extractive sector.292  The policy, which builds on an earlier version, seeks 
“to help Canadian companies strengthen their CSR practices and maximize 
the benefits their investments can provide to those in host countries.”293  
Among other things, the policy encourages the referral of disputes to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
equally applicable to companies operating within or outside the home country. 
290  The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) Environmental and Social Policy 
Statement sets out the “general environmental and social requirements that OPIC applies in 
evaluating prospective projects seeking OPIC support and monitoring on-going OPIC-
supported projects.” OVERSEAS PRIV. INV. CORP., OPIC – ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL 
POLICY STATEMENT 1 (Oct. 15, 2010), 
https://www.opic.gov/sites/default/files/consolidated_esps.pdf. See also Karl P. Sauvant et al., 
Trends in FDI, Home Country Measures and Competitive Neutrality, 2012-2013 Y.B INT’L 
INV. L. & POL’Y 24, n.85 (Andrea K. Bjorklund, ed.), 
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/03/Yb-12-13-ch.-1-8-Nov-13-stand-alone-final-for-
website.pdf. 
291  Financing is available for “companies or joint ventures in emerging markets that are 
majority owned or controlled by Dutch enterprises.”  Fund Emerging Markets for Dutch 
Enterprises, FMO ENTREPRENEURIAL DEV. BANK, https://www.fmo.nl/fom (last visited Jan. 
20, 2016).  Investors must show that they incorporate corporate social responsibility 
principles into their practices; fund managers check such compliance.  Background, DUTCH 
GOOD GROWTH FUND, http://english.rvo.nl/subsidies-programmes/background (last visited 
Jan. 20, 2016). 
292  The policy is titled “Doing Business the Canadian Way: A Strategy to Advance 
Corporate Social Responsibility in Canada’s Extractive Sector Abroad.” Canada’s Enhanced 
Corporate Social Responsibility Strategy to Strengthen Canada’s Extractive Sector Abroad, 
GLOBAL AFF. CAN. (last updated June 8, 2015), http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/other-autre/csr-strat-rse.aspx?lang=eng. 
293  Id. 
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Canada’s National Contact Point (NCP) for the OECD Guidelines.294  
Compliance with the NCP review process is voluntary, but under the new 
policy, companies that choose not to participate in the process face 
withdrawal of Canadian Government advocacy support and economic 
diplomacy.  In addition, non-participation may affect an application for 
financial support.295  A recent request for NCP review concerned the 
operations of China Gold—a British Columbia-registered, Chinese-owned 
mining company listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange—in Tibet.296  In 
connection with a man-made landslide that had killed 83 mine workers,297 
the request argued that the company had failed to adhere to the OECD 
Guidelines, had ignored warnings and protests about the risk of landslide, 
and had abused a number of human rights.298  The company’s failure to 
conduct its operations consistently with the CSR policy, as well as its refusal 
to engage in the NCP process, led to the loss of the Canadian Government’s 
support.299 
Just as Canada has done with respect to outward investment in the 
extractives sector, so other countries can do for outward investment in 
LSLBI.  The above examples demonstrate how home states can make 
outward investor support conditional upon compliance with social or human 
rights standards.  Home states can apply this type of stipulation to foreign 
investment in agriculture, requiring investors seeking government support to 
meet specified right-to-food standards, and withholding support when 
negative impacts exist and cannot be remedied. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
294  Id.; see also Canada’s National Contact Point (NCP) for the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
(MNEs), GLOBAL AFF. CAN. (last updated Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/ncp-pcn/index.aspx?lang=eng&menu_id=1&menu=R. For 
more on CSR, see Corporate Social Reasonability, GLOBAL AFF. CAN. (last updated Dec. 1, 
2015), http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-
domaines/other-autre/csr-rse.aspx?lang=eng. 
295  See Final Statement on the Request for Review Regarding the Operations of China 
Gold International Resources Corp. Ltd., at the Copper Polymetallic Mine at the Gyama 
Valley, Tibet Autonomous Region, GLOBAL AFF. CAN.  (last updated Apr. 8, 2015), 
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/ncp-pcn/statement-
gyama-valley.aspx?lang=eng. 
296  Id. 
297  Id.  
298  Id. 
299  Id. In addition, this case is notable for the Canadian NCP’s determination that it had 
jurisdiction over a Chinese company due to its Canadian ties and the company’s subsequent 
loss of Canadian Government support––potentially opening the doorway for future home state 
regulation of foreign-owned entities and their activities abroad. 
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3. Implementing Disclosure Requirements 
Home states can also strive to shape outward investment indirectly, by 
implementing various disclosure requirements that incentivize more 
responsible business conduct.  Such requirements may simply require 
transparency over aspects of existing operations, or may also impose due 
diligence obligations.  Greater transparency over outward investment in 
LSLBI is a necessary prerequisite to understanding the negative rights 
impacts of investment. Transparency also serves as a powerful tool that 
encourages investors to mitigate their reputational risks by enacting stronger 
safeguards and advancing more responsible operations. 
Home states interested in devising disclosure requirements for outward 
investors engaging in LSLBI can draw further lessons from efforts 
pertaining to the extractive industry.  For example, the U.S. Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 imposes 
disclosure obligations on extractives companies in relation to payments to 
governments.300  Further, the legislation includes a “conflict rule” that 
requires publicly listed companies in the United States whose products may 
contain “conflict minerals” from specific countries to comply with 
assessment and reporting requirements, including conducting supply chain 
due diligence.301  A similar example can be found in the European Union.  A 
2013 European Commission Directive requires publicly listed extractive and 
logging companies, as well as non-listed large companies, to report 
government payments.302  This transparency over payments is meant to 
create greater accountability related to natural resource investment.303  
Additionally, in 2014, an EU regulation to establish a voluntary self-
certification system for importers of conflict minerals was proposed.304  A 
year later, the European Parliament voted to overturn the proposal for a 
voluntary plan, asking instead for a significantly more robust approach of 
mandatory certification covering both importers and downstream 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
300  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 
1504, 124 Stat. 1376, 2220 (2010). 
301  Id. § 1502. 
302  New Disclosure Requirements for the Extractive Industry and Loggers of Primary 
Forests in the Accounting (and Transparency) Directives (Country by Country Reporting) – 
Frequently Asked Questions, EUR. COMMISSION (June 12, 2013), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-13-541_en.htm. 
303  Id. 
304  EU Proposes Responsible Trading Strategy for Minerals from Conflict Zones, EUR. 
COMMISSION (Mar. 5, 2014), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-218_en.htm (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2016). For more information on these disclosure requirements, see Johnson, 
Thomashausen & Cordes, supra note 22929, at 14-16. 
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companies.305 
These disclosure measures related to extractive industry operations 
illustrate the actions that home states can take to catalyze greater 
transparency over outward investment in LSLBI.  Home states that have 
already enacted such disclosure requirements for the extractives sector could 
consider expanding them to also apply to corporations engaged in LSLBI.  
This might be a more efficient approach, and would be a useful step towards 
greater transparency.  It risks, however, a disclosure requirement that is not 
tailored to the most pressing issues related to LSLBI.  Alternatively, home 
states can develop similar requirements of outward investors or listed 
companies involved with LSLBI.  A more tailored approach could ask 
LSLBI investors for disclosure focused on the human rights impacts of their 
investments, including information on forced evictions, displacement, and 
other issues that have negative right-to-food impacts.  Such requirements 
could also ask for the disclosure of land leases from companies that are 
undertaking LSLBI or whose subsidiaries are involved with LSLBI since 
contract transparency can help lead to greater accountability with respect to 
land deals.306  By developing new requirements rather than adapting existing 
ones, home states can learn from current measures while establishing 
requirements that are adapted to the issues and optimized to encourage better 
investment. 
These various measures––assessing and adapting domestic policies, 
conditioning support to outward investors, and implementing disclosure 
requirements––are all avenues through which home states can seek to 
influence outward investment in LSLBI.  They are primarily preemptive, 
through incentivizing responsible investment that does not negatively affect 
human rights.  As with the host state measures discussed above, home states 
should also establish redress mechanisms for right-to-food violations 
associated with outward investment in LSLBI.  This includes allowing tort 
claims in domestic courts for human rights abuses.307  For example, courts in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
305  Conflict Minerals: MEPs Ask for Mandatory Certification of EU Importers, EUR. 
PARLIAMENT NEWS (May 20, 2015), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-
room/content/20150513IPR55318/html/Conflict-minerals-MEPs-ask-for-mandatory-
certification-of-EU-importers. 
306  See, e.g., OPEN LAND CONTRACTS, http://www.openlandcontracts.org/; see also KAROL 
C. BOUDREAUX & YULIYA NEYMAN, USAID, OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR RESPONSIBLE 
LAND-BASED INVESTMENT 38-39 (Mar. 2015), http://www.usaidlandtenure.net/sites/default/ 
files/USAID_Operational_Guidelines_updated.pdf. 
307  While home states can proactively ensure that such claims can be brought in domestic 
courts, they can also consider incorporating relevant commitments into future investment 
treaties that they sign.  For example, clauses that enable judicial action within the home state 
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countries such as England and the Netherlands have begun entertaining tort 
claims against domiciled entities for abuses committed overseas, even 
though similar types of claims have been recently curtailed in the United 
States.308  Outside of the court system, countries can support other types of 
redress mechanisms, such as OECD National Contact Points, that address 
concerns related to outward investment.  A comprehensive home state 
strategy that incorporates preemptive and redress measures can encourage 
more responsible outward investment while providing remedial 
opportunities for individuals who, despite such measures, were harmed by 
investment in LSLBI.  Taken together, these efforts can lead to more rights-
consistent outward investment and help home states meet their 
extraterritorial right-to-food obligations. 
CONCLUSION 
Investment in agriculture is essential for reducing poverty and 
combating hunger.  For too long, agriculture has been neglected by 
governments, donors, and the private sector, resulting in detrimental impacts 
for food security and rural livelihoods.  Yet the way in which such 
investment occurs determines the immediate impact on some of the world’s 
poorest and most food insecure: rural smallholder farmers and individuals 
whose livelihoods depend on access to productive resources.  Standard 
corporate approaches to land-based agricultural investment can violate 
human rights, while existing legal regimes are not geared towards equitable, 
sustainable, and rights-consistent investment.  Although changes are 
occurring within international investment and human rights law, these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
legal system are included in the IISD Model International Agreement on Investment for 
Sustainable Development.  Article 17 notes that “Investors shall be subject to civil actions for 
liability in the judicial process of their home state for the acts or decisions made in relation to 
the investment where such acts or decisions lead to significant damage, personal injuries or 
loss of life in the host state.”  Article 31 focuses on ending forum non conveniens or similar 
rules for certain cases, noting, “Home states shall ensure that their legal systems and rules 
allow for, or do not prevent or unduly restrict, the bringing of court actions on their merits 
before domestic courts relating to the civil liability of investors for damages resulting from 
alleged acts or decisions made by investors in relation to their investments in the territory of 
other Parties.” HOWARD MANN ET AL., INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., IISD MODEL 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 11, 16 (Apr. 
2005), https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/investment_model_int_agreement.pdf. 
308  See Johnson, Thomashausen & Cordes, supra note 229, at 18 (citing Nicola Jägers et 
al., The Future of Corporate Liability for Extraterritorial Human Rights Abuses: The Dutch 
Case Against Shell, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND e-36-41 (2014), 
https://www.asil.org/sites/default/files/AGORA/201401/Jagers%20et%20al%20AJIL%20Unb
ound%20e-36%20(2014).pdf). 
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regimes are presently inadequate for protecting the right to food of 
community members affected by large-scale land-based investment.  More 
immediately, in order to meet their legal obligations with respect to the right 
to food, host and home states must take action to ensure that corporate 
agricultural investments are responsible.  For high-income home states, the 
measures discussed in this Article offer a practical way to give effect to 
global development goals.  For host states, they offer an avenue for ensuring 
that people do not go hungry and that investment occurs in a way that 
respects rights.  Together, home and host state measures offer an opportunity 
to shape foreign direct investment in agriculture into a positive force: one 
that benefits both investors and communities and that promotes, rather than 
harms, the right to food. 
 
